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I.
Introduction
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,1 also
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act in honor of its sponsors Senator Orrin Hatch
and Representative Henry Waxman, was enacted in an attempt to reconcile two
seemingly contradictory policy goals. The Act represented a compromise be-
tween the interests of generic drug manufacturers and the competing interests
of the \pioneer" drug manufacturers who research and develop novel drug prod-
1Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
1ucts.2 Thus, the Act was designed to improve the availability of inexpensive
generic drugs, while maintaining sucient incentives for investment in new drug
development.3
The Act addressed several perceived distortions in the patent term that were
peculiar to the drug context.4 First, pioneer drug manufacturers lost the ben-
et of a large portion of each drug patent's term because so much of the term
expired during the lengthy process of regulatory review by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), before the manufacturer could market its drug.
Without the benet of a full patent term, pioneer drug manufacturers might
not have sucient incentives to make the huge investment required to develop
new drug products. On the other hand, in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that activities undertaken by generic manufacturers seeking FDA approval for
generic drugs, because of their ultimately commercial goals, infringed pioneer
drug patents. Thus, pioneer drug manufacturers could retain market exclusivity
for their drugs beyond the duration of the drugs' patent terms because generic
manufacturers could not even start developing and seeking approval for com-
peting generic products until after the pioneer patent expired.
To compensate for the time lost from the patent term during pioneer drug ap-
proval, the Hatch-Waxman Act created 35 U.S.C. x156, which grants pioneer
drug patentees a limited patent term extension. The extension is based on the
length of the regulatory review period and cannot exceed ve years.6 In reac-
tion to Bolar, 7 the Hatch-Waxman Act created a \safe harbor" for generic drug
manufacturers under 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1). This section provides that it is not
2See Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection
in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
40 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 269, 271 (1985).
3See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, IDEA 389 (1999).
4See David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a Duck... Uncertainties in Implementing the
Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Food
Drug L.J. 111, 113 (1999).
5733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
6See 35 U.S.C. xx 156(c), (g)(6) (1994).
7733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
2an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented product \solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information" for FDA
approval.
The Hatch-Waxman Act also set out procedures for the approval of generic
drugs under abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs), which may rely on
data submitted in the pioneer drug applicant's new drug application (NDA).8
The pioneer drug manufacturer's patent rights are protected by 21 U.S.C. x
355(j)(2)(A)(vii), which requires every ANDA applicant to submit a \certica-
tion" with respect to each patent that covers the corresponding pioneer drug.
The certication must specify (I) that no patent information has been listed for
the drug, (II) that the patent has expired, (III) the patent's expiration date,
or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the commercial
manufacture and marketing of the ANDA applicant's drug.9 A certication of
type IV, a \paragraph IV certication," indicates that the generic manufacturer
seeks approval to market its drug before the pioneer patent expires.
Because x 271(e)(1) creates a safe harbor for the activities of generic manufac-
turers seeking FDA approval, the Hatch-Waxman Act created a new infringe-
ment cause of action allowing patentees to challenge generic manufacturers who
sought to market their drugs before the pioneer drug patent expired. x 271(e)(2)
provides that it is an act of infringement to submit an ANDA for a patented
drug if the purpose of the ANDA is to obtain marketing approval before the
patent expires. Under x 355(j), an ANDA applicant who les a paragraph IV
certication is required to notify the patentee, who then has forty-ve days to
sue for infringement.10 FDA approval of the ANDA is then stayed for thirty
months to allow the suit to be resolved.11 In order to encourage ANDA appli-
cants to challenge dubious pioneer drug patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act also
created a 180-day market exclusivity period for the rst generic manufacturer
8See 21 U.S.C. x 355(j) (1994).
921 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(A) (1994).
10See 21 U.S.C. xx 355(j)(2)(B), (5)(B) (1994).
11See 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B) (1994).
3to le a paragraph IV certication for a given drug.12
The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a complex statutory framework, such that many
problems and debates have arisen surrounding its implementation. This paper
gives an overview of the issues that have been litigated under the Hatch-Waxman
Act in the nearly sixteen years since its enactment.
II.
Litigation of the Patent Term Extension in 35 U.S.C. x 156
A.
Dening \Claims"
35 U.S.C. x 156 provides for the extension of patents that \claim" drug
products, or methods of manufacturing or using those drug products, that
have undergone FDA approval.13 In Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Lehman,14 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed the
meaning of the word \claims" in x 156. The court armed the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Oce's (PTO's) denial of Hoechst's application for patent term
extension because the patent did not \claim" the active ingredient tacrine hy-
12See 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1994).
1335 U.S.C. x 156 (1994) provides that:
(a) The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of using a product, or a method
of manufacturing a product shall be extended in accordance with this section from the original
expiration date of the patent if...
(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing
or use....
(f) For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "product" means:
(A) A drug product.
(B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to regulation under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
(2) The term "drug product" means the active ingredient of -
(A) a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological product... or
(B) a new animal drug or veterinary biological product... including any salt or ester of the
active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination with another active ingredient.
To be eligible for term extension, the patented active ingredient must be present in the drug
at the time of administration. Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 706 F. Supp. 1224, 1227-
28 (Fed.Cir.1990). 1-hydroxy-tacrine is neither a salt nor an ester of tacrine hydrochloride.
14109 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
4drochloride used in an FDA-approved drug for Alzheimer's disease. 15 The
patent disclosed and described in its claims only 1-hydroxy-tacrine, a metabo-
lite of tacrine hydrochloride, and a method for using that compound to treat
patients with memory loss. Thus, even though Hoechst's patent was infringed
when patients ingested and metabolized tacrine hydrochloride, the patent did
not actually \claim" that active ingredient, and therefore was not eligible for
term extension under x 156.16
The court, in an opinion by Judge Clevenger, explained that the plain mean-
ing of \claim" covers \the invention that an applicant believes is patentable" or
\that portion of the specication that denes the patent owner's property rights
in the invention."17 The court distinguished between the concepts of claiming
and infringement: \the claims dene the patent owner's property rights whereas
infringement is the act of trespassing upon those rights."18 Judge Clevenger re-
jected the possibility that the plain language or legislative history of the statute
supported Hoechst's argument that a patent \claims" anything that infringes
it: if Congress intended to refer to infringement, it would have done so ex-
plicitly.19 In a concurring opinion, Judge Newman argued that the legislative
history clearly demonstrates that \claims," as used in x 156, refers to all subject
matter protected by the patent.20 However, she agreed that Hoechst was not
entitled to a patent term extension because it was not a proper applicant: it had
not participated in the regulatory approval process, and the marketing entity
who did obtain FDA approval was not acting as its agent.21
B.
Dening \Drug Product"
15Id. at 757.
16Id.
17Id. at 759.
18Id.
19Id. at 759-60.
20Id. at 764.
21Id. at 762.
5As a requirement for extending the term of a patent on an approved drug
product, 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(5)(A) demands that \the permission for the com-
mercial marketing or use of the product after [the FDA] regulatory review pe-
riod is the rst permitted commercial marketing or use of the product under
the provision of law under which such regulatory review period occurred." x
156(f) denes, in relevant part, \product" as \drug product," and \drug prod-
uct" as \the active ingredient of a new drug... including any salt or ester of
the active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination with another active
ingredient."22 In Fisons PLC v. Quigg,23 the Federal Circuit addressed the
PTO's position that, combining the denition of \product" in x 156(f) and the
extension requirement in x 156(a)(5)(A), patent term extension is available only
for the rst commercial marketing or use of a given active ingredient. Fisons
contended, in contrast, that \product" in x 156(a)(5)(A) refers to the specic
drug product approved by FDA; thus, it was entitled to term extension for each
of three patents that covered dierent rst-approved uses or dosages of the same
active ingredient, cromolyn sodium. None of the patents covered the rst com-
mercially marketed product containing cromolyn sodium, which was approved
in 1973.24
The Federal Circuit rejected Fisons' interpretation as contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute. The court dismissed Fisons' reliance on the last sen-
tence of 35 U.S.C. x 156(a), which states that, \[t]he product referred to in
paragraphs (4) and (5) is hereinafter in this section referred to as the `approved
product"': the sentence is \merely a drafting device adopted to simplify the
language of subsequent provisions in the section," and does not apply to para-
graph (5), which precedes it.25 The court also refused to agree with Fisons
that 35 U.S.C. x 156(c)(4), which states that \in no event shall more than one
patent be extended for the same regulatory review period for any product," sug-
gests that one patent may necessarily be extended for each regulatory review
2235 U.S.C. x 156(f) (1994).
23876 F.2d 99 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
24Id. at 100-101.
25Id. at 101.
6period.26 Analyzing the legislative history, the court found insucient support
for Fisons' views to overcome the plain meaning of the statute. Thus, it armed
the PTO's denial of Fisons' patent term extension applications.27
In Glaxo Operations UK Limited v. Quigg,28 the Federal Circuit addressed an-
other PTO dismissal of an application for patent term extension. Glaxo received
FDA approval for its antibiotic drug Ceftin, which contains the active ingredi-
ent cefuroxime axetil, in 1987. Cefuroxime axetil is an ester of the organic
acid cefuroxime; it becomes therapeutically eective only upon oral administra-
tion. Two salts of cefuroxime, which become therapeutically active antibiotics
only upon intramuscular or intravenous administration, received FDA approval
in 1983 and 1986. They are marketed under the names Zinacef and Kefurox.29
The PTO denied Glaxo's application for term extension for its cefuroxime axetil
patent based on the prior FDA approval of the two cefuroxime salts. The PTO
reasoned that Ceftin did not satisfy the requirement in 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(5)(A)
that \the permission for the commercial marketing or use of the product after
[the FDA] regulatory review period is the rst permitted commercial marketing
or use of the product under the provision of law under which such regulatory
review period occurred."30
Glaxo challenged the PTO's denial, citing the denition of \product" in 35
U.S.C. x 156(f)(2) as \the active ingredient of a new drug... including any salt
or ester of the active ingredient...." The active ingredient in Ceftin is cefuroxime
axetil. Neither Zinacef nor Kefurox is a salt or an ester of cefuroxime axetil.
Thus, Glaxo argued that FDA's approval of Ceftin marked the \rst permit-
ted commercial marketing or use" of the patented \product," such that the
requirement of x 156(a)(5)(A) was satised.31 The PTO replied that Congress
intended to dene \product" broadly as any \new chemical entity" or \new ac-
tive moiety." This denition would cover \all acid, salt, or ester forms of a single
26Id.
27Id. at 101-02.
28894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
29Id. at 393.
30Id. at 394.
31Id.
7therapeutically active substance even if the drug before being administered con-
tained only other substances." Ceftin, Zinacef, and Kefurox are all metabolized
to produce the same therapeutically active chemical entity. Thus, under the
PTO's interpretation, Glaxo could not receive a patent term extension for its
Ceftin patent because the \product," in the form of Zinacef and Kefurox, had
been approved previously by FDA.32
The Federal Circuit found that the plain meaning of the statutory language
\active ingredient of a new drug... including any salt or ester of the active
ingredient"33 supported Glaxo's interpretation. Furthermore, the legislative
history gave no conclusive support for the PTO's broader interpretive gloss.34
The PTO's position was entitled to no deference because it contradicted the
plain, unambiguous statutory text.35 Thus, the court approved the district
court judgment holding that Glaxo's patent term extension application met the
requirements of x 156(a).36
C.
Dening \Regulatory Review Process"
On May 31, 1985, FDA approved Unimed's drug Marinol, the active ingre-
dient of which is a synthetic equivalent of marijuana. However, in its approval
letter, FDA reminded Unimed that it could not market Marinol until the drug
was rescheduled by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) under the Controlled
Substances Act.37 On May 13, 1986, the DEA rescheduled Marinol. Within
two weeks of DEA rescheduling, Unimed applied for a term extension for its
Marinol patent. However, the PTO denied the application as untimely under
35 U.S.C. x 156(d)(1), which provides that an application for patent term ex-
tension \may only be submitted within the sixty-day period beginning on the
date the product received permission under the provision of law under which
32Id.
3335 U.S.C. x 156(f)(2) (1994).
34894 F.2d 392, 395-96 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
35Id. at 398.
36Id. at 400.
37See Unimed, Inc. v. Quigg, 888 F.2d 826, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
8the applicable regulatory review period occurred for commercial marketing or
use."38
In Unimed, Inc. v. Quigg,39 the Federal Circuit addressed Unimed's challenge
to the PTO's denial of its application. The court began by examining 35 U.S.C.
x 156(g)(1)(B), which denes the \regulatory review period" in x 156(d)(1) in
terms of the combined duration of several stages of FDA approval under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).40 In view of this denition,
the \provision of law under which the applicable regulatory review period oc-
curred" in this case was x 505 of the FFDCA, which regulates FDA approval of
new drugs. x 156(d)(1) made no reference to DEA action or 21 U.S.C. x 811(a),
which regulates drug scheduling. Thus, the sixty-day period for submission of
a timely application for patent term extension began on the date of FDA ap-
proval.41
FDA and courts generally agreed that the date of FDA approval was the date of
the FDA approval letter, in this case May 31, 1985.42 The Federal Circuit held
that this did not change because FDA noted in its Marinol approval letter that
marketing could not legally occur until after DEA rescheduling. FDA approval,
which involved only safety and eectiveness, was complete as of the May 31,
1985 approval letter; DEA rescheduling was a separate obstacle to commercial
marketing that was irrelevant for purposes of an application for patent term
extension. Thus, the court armed the PTO's denial of Unimed's application
for patent term extension because it was not led within sixty days of FDA's
approval of Marinol.43
38Id.
39888 F.2d 826, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
40x 156(g)(1)(B) (1988) provides that:
The regulatory review period for a human drug product is the sum of-
(i) the period beginning on the date an exemption under subsection (i) of section 505 or
subsection (d) of section 507 became eective for the approved human drug product and
ending on the date an application was initially submitted for such drug product under section
351, 505, or 507, and
(ii) the period beginning on the date the application was initially submitted for the approved
human drug product under section 351, subsection (b) of section 505, or section 507 and
ending on the date such application was approved under such section.
4112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1644, 1645-46 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
42Id. at 1646.
43Id. at 1646-47.
9In Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Quigg,44 Westwood challenged the denial
of a term extension for the patent covering its approved drug Lac-Hydrin, which
contained the active ingredient lactic acid and was intended for treatment of dry,
itchy skin. In denying Westwood's application, the PTO reasoned that eight
other lactic acid drugs had previously been approved by FDA, such that Lac-
Hydrin was not \the rst permitted commercial marketing or use of the product
under the provision of law under which such regulatory review period occurred,"
as required for patent term extension under 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(5)(A).45
For new drugs, the \provision of law under which [the] regulatory review period
occur[s]" is x 505 of the FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. x 355. This section has governed
new drug approval since 1938; however, it was changed signicantly in 1962,
when new eectiveness requirements were added. Westwood argued that the
1962 amendments were so drastic that the old and new versions of x 505 con-
stituted dierent \provisions of law" for purposes of x 156(a)(5)(A). Since the
eight lactic acid drugs approved by FDA before Lac-Hydrin were all approved
under the pre-1962 version of x 505, they did not preclude a patent term exten-
sion for Lac-Hydrin under x 156(a)(5)(A).46
In response, the PTO argued that x 505 of the FFDCA was a single provision
of law, regardless of whether it had been amended over time. Even if the provi-
sion was signicantly dierent before and after the 1962 amendments, products
approved before 1962 are considered to be approved under the amended x 505.
Thus, even if the \provision of law" for purposes of x 156(a)(5)(A) was limited
to x 505 as amended in 1962, Lac-Hydrin did not constitute the \rst permit-
ted commercial marketing or use" of lactic acid under that provision.47 The
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found the PTO's interpretation
consistent with statute's text and legislative history; thus, it deferred to the
PTO's decision and armed the denial of Westwood's application for patent
4413 U.S.P.Q.2d 2067 (D.D.C. 1989).
45Id. at 2068.
46Id. at 2068-69.
47Id. at 2069.
10term extension.48
In Hoechst AG v. Quigg,49 the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTO's denial of
a patent term extension for Hoechst's drug Trental for failure to satisfy the
requirement in 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(4) that \the product has been subject to a
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use." 35 U.S.C.
x 156(g)(1)(A) denes the \regulatory review period" of a new drug as \the
period described in subparagraph (B) to which the limitation described in para-
graph (6) applies." 35 U.S.C. x 156(g)(1)(B) in turn sets out the duration of
the regulatory review period: the sum of the testing phase and approval phase
periods for the drug.50 For Trental, the calculation under x 156(g)(1)(B), re-
duced as required under x 156(c), yields a patent extension term of 6.8 years.
The dispute between Hoechst and the PTO involved the eect of the language
\to which the limitation described in paragraph (6) applies."51
35 U.S.C. x 156(g)(6) provides the following limitations:
(A) If the patent involved was issued after the date of enactment of this
section, the period of extension... may not exceed ve years.
(B) If the patent involved was issued before the date of the enactment of the
section and -
(i) no request for an exemption described in (1)(B)... was submitted... before
such date for the approved product the period of extension... may not exceed
ve years....
(C) If the patent involved was issued before the date of the enactment of this
section and if an action described in subparagraph (B) was taken before the
date of the enactment of this section with respect to the approved product and
the commercial marketing or use of the product has not been approved before
such date, the period of extension... may not exceed two years....
None of these limitation was applicable to Trental: (A) because the patent
issued before the date of enactment, (B) because Hoechst applied for the relevant
exemption before that date, and (C) because Trental was approved before that
date.52
48Id. at 2069-70.
49917 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
50See supra note 40.
51917 F.2d 522, 524 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
52Id. at 525.
11The PTO argued that \to which the limitation described in paragraph (6)
applies" was part of the denition of \regulatory review period." Thus, if none of
the limitations in x 156 (g)(6) obtained, the applicant was entitled to no patent
term extension. The PTO argued that its view was supported by the principle
of construing statutes to avoid rendering any language superuous, as well as
legislative history demonstrating congressional intent to prevent any patent term
extension greater than ve years.53 Hoechst replied that, according to the plain
meaning of the statute, the limitations in paragraph (6) merely cap the length
of the extensions for eligible patents; they are not part of the denition of
\regulatory review period" for purposes of determining which patents are eligible
for extension. In Hoechst's view, the lack of a limit on the duration of the
term extension for a small category of drugs like Trental was simply due to
Congressional oversight.54
The Federal Circuit reviewed the legislative history of x 156 and decided
that Congress intended to dene \regulatory review period" in xx 156(g)(1)-
(5), with x 156(g)(6) functioning only as a limitation on the duration of the
term extension. The language \to which the limitation described in paragraph
(6) applies is \merely an internal cross-reference."55 Thus, Trental met all the
statutory requirements for term extension under x 156. Congress almost de-
nitely did not intend to grant Hoechst a patent term extension greater than 5
years; however, there was no reason to believe Congress meant to deny Hoechst
any term extension, and the statutory formula unambiguously yields a 6.8 year
extension for Trental. Thus, the court refused to contort the statute to attempt
to remedy an anomalous result: it held that Hoechst was entitled to a 6.8 year
term extension for its Trental patent.56
In Astra v. Lehman,57 the Federal Circuit held that the Secretary of Health
53Id.
54Id.
55Id. at 527-28.
56Id. at 529.
5771 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
12and Human Services, or FDA as the Secretary's delegate, must determine the
regulatory review period from which the patent term extension is calculated; the
Commissioner of Patents has no authority to revise or put aside the Secretary's
determination. Astra submitted an application for patent term extension for
its anti-viral drug Foscavir. According to the statutory scheme in 35 U.S.C. x
156, the Commissioner of Patents requested that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services determine the applicable regulatory review period required for
calculating the term extension.58 The Secretary determined the regulatory re-
view period, based on the sum of the \testing" and \approval" phases of FDA
review,59 and published it in the Federal Register as required.60 The Commis-
sioner in turn used the Secretary's determination to calculate the patent term
extension61 as one half the testing phase plus the full approval phase.62 As-
tra believed that the Secretary's determination placed too much time in the
testing phase and not enough time in the approval phase, such that the overall
calculated term extension was shorter than it should have been. However, As-
tra forewent its opportunity to challenge the Secretary's determination at the
time of its publication63; instead, Astra sought later to have the Commissioner
recalculate its term extension. The Commissioner denied Astra's petition for
review, reasoning that he had no authority to reconsider the Secretary's deter-
mination.64
The court held that the clear, unambiguous statutory language supported the
Commissioner's position.65 35 U.S.C. x 156(d)(2)(A) states that:
(A) Within 60 days of the submittal of an application for extension of the
term of a patent under paragraph (1), the Commissioner shall notify...
(ii) the Secretary of Health and Human Services... and shall submit to the
Secretary... a copy of the application.... [T]he Secretary... shall review the
dates contained in the application... and determine the applicable regulatory
review period, shall notify the Commissioner of the determination, and shall
58Id. at 1579.
59See 35 U.S.C. x 156(g)(1)(B) (1994), supra note 40.
60See 35 U.S.C. x 156(d)(2)(A) (1994).
61See 35 U.S.C. x 156(c) (1994).
6271 F.3d 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
63See 21 C.F.R. xx 60.24, 60.26 (1994).
6471 F.3d 1578, 1579-80.
65Id. at 1580.
13publish in the Federal Register a notice of such determination.
Thus, the court found that the statute \plainly mandates the Secretary, not
the Commissioner, to determine the regulatory review period."66 This con-
clusion was not undermined by provision in 35 U.S.C. x 156(d)(1)(C) that an
application for patent term extension must contain \information to enable the
Commissioner and the Secretary of Health and Human Services... to determine
the period of the extension under subsection (g)." Although the Commissioner
and the Secretary determine the extension period jointly, the Secretary alone is
responsible for determining the regulatory review period under x 156(d)(2)(A).
Thus, after noting that the legislative history was consistent with the plain
meaning of the statutory text, the court denied Astra's request for a recalcula-
tion of its patent term extension by the Commissioner.67
D.
Interaction with the URAA
Enacted in 1984, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)68 changed
the term of a U.S. patent from seventeen years from the date of issue to twenty
years from the date of ling.69 For patents in force on June 8, 1995, the URAA's
eective date, the term would be the greater of twenty years from ling or
seventeen years from issue.70 The URAA limits the remedies a patentee may
assert against parties who, before June 8, 1995, had begun or made a substantial
investment towards activities that became infringing only as a result of a term
extension under the URAA.71 Patentees may not assert the usual infringement
remedies in 35 U.S.C. xx 283-85 against such activities during the period of
URAA extension (the \delta period"), and are instead entitled only to equitable
66Id.
67Id.
68Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4983 (1994).
69See 35 U.S.C. x 154(a)(2) (1994).
70See 35 U.S.C. x 154(c)(2) (1994).
71Id.
14remuneration.72
In Merck & Co. v. Kessler,73 the Federal Circuit considered whether patents
already in force on June 8, 1995 could combine extensions under the URAA with
extensions under x 156. Each of the patents in suit was in force on June 8, 1995
and had received a two-year extension under x 156; some of the patents were still
in force only because of that extension. The patents had been granted seventeen
year terms at issuance, but these terms would be extended if the patentees took
advantage of the alternative term of twenty years from ling under the URAA.74
However, FDA refused to publish new expiration dates for these patents using
the twenty-year term. Its refusal was based on a PTO \Final Determination,"75
which stated that patents in force on June 8, 1995 could not combine a twenty-
year term under the amended URAA with an extension under x 156.76 PTO's
position rested on the provision in 35 U.S.C. x 156(a) that a patent term \shall
be extended in accordance with this section from the original expiration date
of the patent" (emphasis added). The PTO reasoned that any patent issued
before June 8, 1995 was granted for a term of seventeen years. Thus, the date
seventeen years after the issue date was the \original expiration date" and an
extension under x 156 could be added only to that date. The PTO also noted
that in some cases, absent recalculation, combining the twenty-year term under
the URAA with an extension already granted under x 156 would cause the total
extended patent term to violate the fourteen-year post-approval extended term
cap set out in 35 U.S.C. x 156(c)(3).77
The Federal Circuit rejected the PTO's interpretation of \original expiration
date."78 The court examined the legislative history of x 156 and determined
that the phrase \original expiration date" was included to assure that no more
than one x 156 term extension was granted to any patent to compensate for
72See 35 U.S.C. x 154 (c)(2),(3) (1994).
7380 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
74Id. at 1548.
7560 Fed. Reg. 30,069-71 (1995).
7680 F.3d 1543, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
77Id.
78Id. at 1550.
15time lost during regulatory review. Thus, the \original expiration date" was
simply the date the patent would expire absent an extension under x 156.79
While patentees were limited to one x 156 extension, the \original expiration
date" language did not prevent patentees from enjoying an extension under the
URAA as well as a x 156 extension. The combined extension was, however,
limited by the fourteen-year post-approval term cap in x 156(c)(3); thus, some
pre-June 8, 1995 extensions might require recalculation.80
Next, the court addressed the problem of the dierent remedies available to
patentees during successive extension periods under x 156 and the URAA. The
court was not overly troubled by the possibility that a patentee might be entitled
to full remedies for the rst seventeen years after ling, then only equitable re-
muneration with regard to certain activities during the delta period, and nally
full remedies again, but only with respect to the approved product, during the x
156 extension period.81 Drug patent infringers whose activities were protected
by the URAA were few in number and were likely to be generic drug manufactur-
ers with additional limits on their infringing behavior. A generic manufacturer
could not seek market approval for its drug during the delta period without
exposing itself to suit for infringement.82 If the patentee sued, FDA would stay
approval of the generic drug until the patent expired, the suit was resolved, or
thirty months, a period almost certainly longer than the delta period, passed.83
Thus, the court decided that the minimal possibility of problems in a few special
cases should not prevent the majority of patentees from enjoying an extension
under x 156 as well as a twenty-year term under the URAA.84
Finally, the court turned to the patents in suit that were in force on June 8,
1995 only because they had been extended under x 156. The court agreed with
the PTO that these patents were not entitled to the twenty-year term under the
79Id. at 1550-51.
80Id. at 1551.
81Id.
82See DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
83See 21 U.S.C. x 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii) (1994).
8480 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
16URAA.85 The court reasoned that allowing combined x 156 and URAA exten-
sions for these patents would violate the limits contained 35 U.S.C. x 156(a)(2)
and (g)(6), which require that the patent term be extended only once under x
156 and that the total extension not exceed two years.86 The court also noted
that the inconsistent remedy problem would be serious for these patents. Their
enforcement had been restricted to one approved product before the URAA was
enacted; \[t]o follow this period of limited enforcement with enforcement for all
products covered by the patent (or delta enforcement in some cases) and then
return to one product enforcement again can only be characterized as bizarre."87
Thus, the court concluded that patents in force on June 8, 1995 only as a result
of an extension under x 156 were not entitled to a twenty-year term under the
URAA; however, all other patents in force on June 8, 1995 were eligible for a
twenty-year URAA term as well as a x 156 extension.
III.
Litigation of Infringement and the Safe Harbor under 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)
A.
Scope of the x 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor
1.
Products
x 271(e)(1) provides that:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, oer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)
which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA,
hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specic genetic manip-
ulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
85Id.
86Id.
87Id. at 1553.
17submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.88
\
Patented invention" is dened in x 100(a) to include any \invention or dis-
covery," and is not limited to drug-related inventions.89 Thus, Medtronic sought
to defend an infringement suit brought against it by Eli Lilly in 1983 by arguing
that all of the activity involving its implantable cardiac debrillator, a medical
device used in the treatment of heart patients, fell within the safe harbor of
x 271(e)(1).90 Eli Lilly argued that \a Federal law which regulates the manu-
facture, use, or sale of drugs,"91 referred only to provisions within the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)92 relating to regulatory approval of
drugs, and not the entire FFDCA, which also governs the regulatory approval
of medical devices.93 The Supreme Court rejected this view, instead accept-
ing Medtronic's reading, which applied x 271(e)(1) to activities seeking FDA
approval for any product governed by the FFDCA. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, reasoned that the most common understanding of taking an ac-
tion \under a federal law" involves acting within a comprehensive regulatory
scheme.94 He also found it persuasive that the immediately proceeding pro-
vision in the Hatch-Waxman Act used the narrower term \provision of law"
rather than the more ambiguous \law"; if Congress had meant to restrict the
safe harbor to drug, as opposed to device, inventions, it would have done so
using such clear, simple language.95
Scalia went on to discuss the role of the Hatch-Waxman Act as a compromise
between the interests of generic and pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers. The
Act was designed to eliminate distortions present at both ends of the patent term
due to FDA review: pioneer manufacturers could receive patent extensions to
compensate for the regulatory review period, during which they were unable to
8835 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
8935 U.S.C. x 100(a) (1994).
90Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 664 (1990).
9135 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1) (1994).
9221 U.S.C. xx 301- 395 (1994).
93496 U.S. 661, 664 (1990).
94Id. at 667.
95Id.
18capitalize on their patents, and generic manufacturers were permitted to make,
use, and sell patented technology before the patent's expiration date, as long
as their activities were related to seeking FDA approval.96 Because patents on
medical devices are eligible for patent term extension, Scalia reasoned that the
balance sought by the Act required that they also be subject to the x 271(e)(1)
safe harbor. Scalia noted that his interpretation of the statute would lead to a
near-perfect correspondence between the products eligible for patent term ex-
tension and those qualifying for the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor, since the products
eligible for patent term extension are generally also subject to pre-market ap-
proval under the FFDCA.97
The FFDCA divides medical devices into Classes I, II, and III, which cover in-
creasingly risky products subject to increasingly stringent regulatory approval
requirements. While Class III medical devices, such as Medtronic's implantable
cardiac debrillator, are subject to an exacting pre-market approval process, the
regulatory requirements for Class I and II devices are much less demanding.98 In
an unpublished opinion in Chartex International, PLC v. M.D. Personal Prod-
ucts Corp., the Federal Circuit rst addressed, and rejected in a footnote, the
possibility that the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor might only apply to Class III medi-
cal devices, because only they are subject pre-market approval requirements as
stringent as those for drugs.99
In Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,100 a suit involving a plasma sterilizer, a Class II
medical device, the court analyzed the issue fully, applying the Supreme Court's
Eli Lilly decision. Judge Rader, writing for the court, recognized a tension be-
tween the Supreme Court's specic reasoning and its somewhat broader hold-
ing.101 Justice Scalia's rationale, which hinged on the balance between patent
term extensions for time lost during a demanding regulatory review process and
a safe harbor for activities seeking approval of a generic product, suggests that
96Id. at 669-70.
97Id. at 672-74.
98See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
995 F.3d 1505 (table, text in Westlaw), 1993 WL 306169, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
100122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
101Id. at 1029.
19x 271(e)(1) should apply to only those products whose patents are eligible for
patent term extensions; since patents on Class II medical devices cannot be
extended, Class II devices should not be covered by the safe harbor. However,
Class II medical devices should be covered by x 271(e)(1) under the Supreme
Court's broad holding that the language \a federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs" extends the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor to any
product regulated by the FFDCA. Judge Rader felt bound by the Supreme
Court's broader holding and noted that the Supreme Court explicitly adopted
an interpretation creating some situations where patent term extension and safe
harbor coverage would not correspond; thus, he held that Class II medical de-
vices are covered by the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor.102
2.
Activities
Courts have also struggled with the language \solely for uses reasonably re-
lated to the development and submission of information"103 for FDA approval
in dening the scope of the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor. Initially, district courts were
divided, some applying a stringent analysis focusing on the word \solely," and
others applying a more lenient analysis based on the words \reasonably related
to." For example, in Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v. Genentech,
Inc.,104 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found
that Genentech's activities involving Factor VIII:C, a protein involved with hu-
man blood clotting, were not covered by the safe harbor because Genentech
had not made and used Factor VIII:C \solely" for generation of information
required for FDA approval.105 The court explained that, \[e]ven if the uses
to which Genentech... put the Factor VIII:C were reasonably related to meet-
ing FDA requirements, they certainly were not solely related to that purpose";
102Id.
10335 U.S.C. x 271(e)(1) (1994).
104666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
105Id. at 1396.
20the uses also involved preparation of foreign patent applications, development
of commercial manufacturing processes, receipt of funds for supplying product,
and contemplation of foreign marketing before Scripps' patent expired.106 The
court concluded that , \[t]hese sales and uses of Factor VIII:C, serving mul-
tiple purposes unrelated to meeting FDA requirements, clearly lie beyond the
protection of x 271(e)(1)."107
However, in Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol,108
another Factor VII:C case involving similar facts, the District Court for the
District of Delaware was less sympathetic to Scripps' arguments. The court
denied a motion to strike Baxter's x 271(e)(1) defense, maintaining that it is
\still unclear... what is meant by the phrase `solely for uses reasonably related
to' gathering and submitting information and whether Section 271(e)(1) should
apply even if the data are also given to foreign regulatory agencies."109 The
court found merit in Baxter's argument that its activities, which involved sub-
mitting data for foreign patents and regulatory approval and thus could result in
marketing before Scripps' patent expired, might still qualify for the x 271(e)(1)
safe harbor because all of the experiments generated information required for
FDA approval, and all of the foreign regulatory data were also submitted to
FDA to aid in U.S. approval.110 The court noted that the Northern California
District Court described above had \interpreted the statute to only cover activ-
ities that were `solely related' to FDA approval and did not consider what acts
are `reasonably related' to it." The court then reserved for trial \[t]he question
of law... whether any foreign activities can be `reasonably related' to FDA drug
approval."111
In Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Systems,112 the Northern Dis-
trict of California reconsidered its position. Relying heavily on Intermedics Inc.
106Id.
107Id.
1081988 WL 22602 (D. Del. 1988).
109Id. at *4.
110Id. at *5.
111Id.
11224 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
21v. Ventritex Co.,113 a case it had decided since Scripps Clinic that focused on
the phrase \reasonably related to" rather than word \solely" and thus engaged
in a much more permissive analysis under x 271(e)(1), the court recognized that
\'solely' in Section 271(e)(1) is correctly read as modifying `uses,' not `reason-
ably related."'114 Thus, the court rejected its narrower Scripps Clinic analysis
and held that \[i]f the otherwise infringing uses were reasonably related to gath-
ering information for submission to the FDA, then Cygnus is protected by the
statutory exemption in Section 271(e)(1).... That other purposes may also be
served is irrelevant, because Congress chose the term `uses' not `purposes."'115
The court also noted that provision of data about the accused device to for-
eign agencies and potential investors is not infringing activity under 35 U.S.C. x
271(a), which prohibits only making, using, selling, oering for sale, or import-
ing the accused device; thus, the application of the safe harbor in x 271(e)(1)
to data dissemination is irrelevant.116
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,117 the Federal Circuit
resolved the issue in favor of a broad interpretation similar to the Elan court's.
The Federal Circuit armed a grant of summary judgment for defendant Ven-
tritex, nding that all of its activities, including clinical trials, sales of the device
for implantation during clinical trials, display of the device at medical confer-
ences to physicians and non-physicians, and description of clinical trial progress
to physicians, investors, analysts, and journalists for fund-raising purposes, were
either non-infringing data dissemination or \solely for uses reasonably related"
to obtaining FDA approval.118 Demonstration to non-physicians did not fall
outside the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor because the demonstrations were designed
to attract clinical investigators for FDA-mandated clinical trials; the fact that
a few non-physicians, who couldn't implant the device anyway, witnessed the
113775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
11424 U.S.P.Q.2d 1926, 1932 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
115Id.
116Id.
117982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
118Id. at 1523-25.
22demonstration, did not preclude safe harbor protection.119 The court recognized
that data dissemination is not an infringing activity under x 271(a) and thus
requires no safe harbor under x 271(e)(1); it also rejected Telectronics' argument
that using data for purposes unrelated to FDA reporting should revoke the safe
harbor for the activities that generated the data.120 The statutory language
was clear and created no such limitation. Moreover, the legislative history of
the Hatch-Waxman Act showed Congress' awareness of the need for pre-patent
expiration fund-raising and marketing preparation activities by generic manu-
facturers: \By permitting the testing and regulatory approval process to begin
well before a controlling patent had run its course, Congress must have intended
to allow competitors to be in a position to market their products as soon as it
was legally permissible."121
The Federal Circuit again armed summary judgment for the defendant in In-
termedics, Inc. v. Ventritex Co.,122 nding that all of Ventritex's otherwise
infringing activity fell within the x 271(e)(1) exemption. The court rejected
Intermedics' assertion that Ventritex's use and sale of its implantable cardiac
debrillator in Germany might not be exempt, nding that each device sold and
used in Germany was implanted by a clinical investigator and used to generate
data only submitted for FDA approval.123 The court then cited Telectronics in
nding Ventritex's trade show displays exempt, reasoning that Ventritex could
continue to recruit potential investigators throughout the FDA approval process
because it had no way to know how much clinical data FDA would require.124
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Intermedics' contention that x 271(e)(1)
protection should be barred if the defendant seeks to commercialize the accused
device before the allegedly infringed patent expires. As in Telectronics, the court
relied on the plain language of the statute and the legislative history suggesting
a Congressional desire for generic commercialization immediately upon patent
119Id. at 1523.
120Id. at 1524.
121Id. at 1525.
122991 F.2d 808 (table, text in Westlaw), 1993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
123Id. at *3.
124Id. at *4.
23expiration to rule out such a limitation. The court concluded that \[r]eliance
on section 271(e)(1) is not precluded by manifestation of an intent to commer-
cialize upon FDA approval."125
The Federal Circuit's current analytical stance is summarized well in its opinion
in Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.:
Section 271(e)(1) requires only that the otherwise infringing act be per-
formed \solely for uses reasonably related to" FDA approval. The statute,
therefore, does not look to the underlying purposes or attendant consequences
of the activity... as long as the use is reasonably related to FDA approval.
In other words, the statutory language allows [generic manufacturers] to use...
data... for more than FDA approval. As long as the activity is reasonably re-
lated to obtaining FDA approval,... intent or alternative uses are irrelevant to
[invocation of] the section 271(e)(1) shield.126
Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.127 exemplies the current per-
missive x 271(e)(1) analysis employed by district courts. Amgen sued Hoechst
Marion Roussel for activities allegedly infringing its patents on recombinant
erythropoietin, a hormone involved in red blood cell production. The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts formulated its inquiry as follows:
to fall within the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor, the defendants \must make, use, or
sell the patented invention in ways that objectively bear reasonable prospects
of yielding information that might be relevant in the FDA approval process."128
The court went on to explain that, \[i]f the Defendants have conned them-
selves to such uses, then their subsequent use of the information gathered, their
ulterior motives for engaging in the research, and the existence of other more
promising or less extensive uses that also might have lead to FDA acceptance
are all statutorily irrelevant factors."129 Under this broad test, the court found
that all of the following activities fell within the x 271(e) safe harbor: export to
Japan for use in developing an alternative manufacturing procedure; tests not
submitted to FDA, but used to conrm data that were submitted; production
of consistency batches required for FDA approval but abandoned due to dis-
125Id. at *5.
126122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
1273 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
128Id. at 108.
129Id.
24satisfaction with product quality; use of protein characterization data required
for FDA approval to assess infringement under plainti's patent; and designing
clinical trials, the results of which were submitted to FDA, to meet more strin-
gent foreign regulatory approval requirements.130
While the trend has clearly been toward an expansive interpretation of the x
271(e)(1), district courts have not been blindly permissive in applying the ex-
emption. In NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.,131 the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Jersey refused to nd all of defendant Immunomedics'
activities exempt on a motion for summary judgment. While the court found
that some of Immunomedics' activities clearly fell within the safe harbor, it
denied summary judgment regarding shipment of samples to foreign regulatory
agencies and work by one foreign investigator.132 The court held that manu-
facture within the U.S. for shipment to foreign regulatory agencies or foreign
investigators whose tests are not suitable for or intended for submission to FDA
is a non-exempt, infringing activity.133
In Amgen, Inc. v. Elanex Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,134 the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington similarly refused summary judgments for
the defendants. The court explained that, although Elanex asserted an inten-
tion to seek FDA approval, it had not actually sought FDA approval of any
of its studies or submitted any information to FDA, and it had admitted that
much of its U.S. activity was conducted to support its European marketing ef-
fort. Thus, an issue of fact clearly remained as to whether Elanex's infringing
activities were exempt under x 271(e)(1).135
Finally, in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,136 the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts held that Biogen's activities in connection with its
multiple sclerosis drug Avonex were not exempt because \Biogen had done far
130Id. at 109-11.
131877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
132Id. at 214.
133Id. at 209-11.
1341996 WL 84590 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
135Id. at *4.
136954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996).
25more than merely do clinical trials for submission to the FDA[. I]t had spent
$24 million to stockpile and prepare to market Avonex immediately upon the
anticipated, imminent FDA approval in order to access promptly the lucrative
market for beta interferon drugs to combat multiple sclerosis."137 The court
also cited NeoRx138 in holding that Biogen's production of Avonex in the U.S.
for shipment to foreign regulatory authorities was not covered by the x 271(e)(1)
safe harbor.139 Thus, while the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor has been interpreted as
a broad license for generic drug manufacturers to engage in otherwise infringing
activity, courts will put bounds on the allowable breadth of such activity in
extreme cases.
B.
Scope of the x 271(e)(2) Infringement Analysis
x 271(e)(2) allows adjudication of patent disputes involving generic drugs
during the FDA regulatory approval process, despite the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor,
by making into an act of infringement the submission of an ANDA seeking FDA
approval for commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a generic product before
the pioneer patent has expired.140 In Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.,141 the
Federal Circuit outlined the scope of the infringement analysis under x 271(e)(2),
which poses diculties because it involves a product that is still undergoing
137Id. at 396-97.
138877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
139954 F. Supp. 391, 397 (D. Mass. 1996).
14035 U.S.C. x 271(e)(2) (1994) provides that:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit -
(A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or
described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which
is claimed in a patent, or
(B) an application under section 512 of such Act or under the Act of March 4, 1913 (21 U.S.C.
151-158) for a drug or veterinary biological product which is not primarily manufactured using
recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site
specic genetic manipulation techniques and which is claimed in a patent or the use of which
is claimed in a patent, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such
Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug or veterinary biological
product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration
of such patent.
141110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
26development. In arming the dismissal of Glaxo's infringement claims, the
court rejected Glaxo's argument that the infringement analysis should focus
on whether the scope of ANDA approval sought would allow Novopharm to
commercialize an infringing product. Instead, the court agreed with Novopharm
that the inquiry properly focused on what Novopharm would actually sell under
the ANDA, if and when it obtained approval. Additionally, the burden remained
on patentee Glaxo to prove infringement by a preponderance of the evidence;
the broad ANDA scope did not shift the burden to defendant Novopharm to
prove that the drug it would market would not infringe.142
The court explained that the statute creates an act of infringement only when
the ANDA seeks pre-expiration approval for commercial manufacture, use, or
sale of the patented drug. Thus, the statute mandates an infringement analysis
based on the product that will likely be sold upon FDA approval; the analysis
should consider all relevant evidence, including the ANDA itself and materials
submitted to FDA.143 The court noted that in Eli Lilly v. Medtronic,144 Justice
Scalia described infringement under x 271(e)(2) as \articial," because no in-
fringing device that had actually been made, sold, or used, was available for the
court to compare to the patent claims. 145 The court concluded that, because
of this articiality:
[t]he patentee's burden of proving ultimate infringement is not met by the
ling of the ANDA. The relevant inquiry is whether the patentee has proven by
a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged infringer will likely market an
infringing product. What is likely to be sold, or, preferably, what will be sold,
will ultimately determine whether infringement exists.146
C.
Interaction with the URAA
As described above, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA),147 signed
into law December 8, 1994, amended the U.S. Patent Code to change the term
142Id. at 1567.
143Id. at 1568.
144496 U.S. 675, 677 (1990).
145110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
146Id. at 1570.
147Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4983 (1994).
27of a U.S. patent from seventeen years from the issue date to twenty years from
the ling date.148 For patents already in force on June 8, 1995, the URAA's
eective date, the term would be the greater of twenty years from ling or sev-
enteen years from issuance.149 The URAA created a limited safe harbor for
parties who, before June 8, 1995, had begun or made a substantial investment
in activities that became infringing only as a result of a term extension under
the URAA.150 This safe harbor prevents patentees from asserting traditional
patent remedies under 35 U.S.C. xx 283-85 against such activities during the
period of URAA extension (the \delta period"); the patentee is entitled only to
equitable remuneration.151
The Federal Circuit examined the interplay between the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the URAA in two 1995 cases. First, in DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,152 several generic manufacturers asserted the right
to manufacture and sell generic captopril, a heart drug, during the delta period
of Bristol-Myers Squibb's captopril patent. The generic companies claimed that
such marketing would be covered by the URAA's safe harbor. The court ex-
plained that FDA required generic manufacturers wishing to market their drugs
during the delta period of a pioneer patent to amend their ANDAs to include
a paragraph IV certication; however, ling a paragraph IV certication con-
stitutes infringement under x 271(e)(2) and requires FDA to suspend approval
of the ANDA until the patentee has had an opportunity to bring an infringe-
ment suit.153 The court then held that the URAA adjusts the remedies for
certain infringing acts during the delta period but does not aect the denition
of infringement under x 271(e)(2) or the FDA regulatory approval procedures
for ANDAs.154 Thus, the generic manufacturers were not entitled to any relief;
they were required to comply with the usual ANDA paragraph IV certication
148See 35 U.S.C. x 154(a)(2) (1994).
149See 35 U.S.C. x 154(c)(2) (1994).
150Id.
151See 35 U.S.C. x 154 (c)(2),(3) (1994).
15262 F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
153Id. at 1400.
154Id. at 1402.
28procedures allowing the pioneer drug patentee to litigate an infringement suit
to the full extent permitted by law.155
Royce Laboratories amended its captopril ANDA to include a paragraph IV cer-
tication. However, the certication did not assert invalidity or non-infringement
of the captopril patent; instead, it alleged that marketing generic captopril dur-
ing the delta period was allowable under the URAA safe harbor. Bristol-Myers
Squibb then sued Royce Laboratories under x 271(e)(2).156 The Federal Circuit
agreed with Bristol-Myers Squibb that the URAA safe harbor did not permit
marketing of generic drugs during the delta period of a pioneer drug patent. As
in DuPont Merck,157 the court explained that the URAA does not make infring-
ing conduct non-infringing during the delta period; instead, it merely limits the
remedies patentees may assert against certain infringing conduct during that
time.158 Thus, the URAA did not change the fact that Royce had commit-
ted an act of infringement under x 271(e)(2) by submitting an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certication. Because Royce had asserted neither invalidity nor
non-infringement of the captopril patent, the paragraph IV certication was
incorrect, and Bristol-Myers Squibb was entitled to the usual remedy for such
incorrect certication: Royce could not obtain FDA approval of its ANDA until
the captopril patent expired.159
D.
Declaratory Judgment
One of the rst courts to address the issue of a declaratory judgment in
relation to x 271(e) was the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
in Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.160 Zenith sued under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. x 2201, seeking a declaration that
its activities in relation to its generic antibiotic cefadroxil DC did not infringe
155Id.
156Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Laboratories, Inc., 69 F.3d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
15762 F.3d 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
15869 F.3d 1130, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
159Id. at 1137-38.
1601991 WL 267892 (D.N.J. 1991).
29Bristol-Myers Squibbs' (Bristol's) patent. The court began by explaining that
actions for declaratory judgment can be heard only if an \actual case or con-
troversy" exists; the existence of such case or controversy is determined from
the totality of the circumstances. The court then laid out the Federal Circuit's
test for the existence of an actual case or controversy: rst, the plainti must
have a \reasonable apprehension," based on the defendant's conduct, that the
defendant will sue him for infringement if he continues his allegedly infringing
activity and, second, the plainti must have actually produced or prepared to
produce the allegedly infringing device.161
The court found that Zenith had an objectively reasonable apprehension of
suit based on Bristol's conduct: Bristol had already sued Zenith's intended sup-
plier under the patent at issue and had sued Zenith under a dierent patent.162
The court then went on to consider whether Zenith had made the \meaningful
preparation" to infringe that is necessary to satisfy the second prong of the Fed-
eral Circuit's declaratory judgment test. To meet the \meaningful preparation"
standard, Zenith would have to have the \immediate intention and ability to
infringe."163 The court held that Zenith could not satisfy this standard with
respect to the future marketing of cefadroxil DC because too many contingent
factors were involved. Zenith had not yet received FDA approval or secured a
supplier with FDA approval, and its only potential supplier had rested its deci-
sion to supply on several contingent conditions. Thus, the court found that the
required case or controversy was lacking for a declaration that future marketing
of cefadroxil DC by Zenith would not infringe Bristol's patent.164
However, the court found that there was sucient case or controversy for it to
hear a declaratory judgment suit regarding Zenith's activities before FDA in
seeking approval for cefadroxil DC. Zenith clearly had present ability and inten-
tion to infringe under x 271(e)(2): for several years it had actively sought FDA
161Id. at *4.
162Id. at *5.
163Id. at *5-6.
164Id. at *6.
30approval to market cefadroxil DC before Bristol's patent expired.165 The court
then explained that its jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgments Act was
discretionary; however, in this case it would exercise its discretion to hear the
case. The court noted Zenith's interest in determining whether it was worthwhile
to continue prosecuting its application for FDA approval, which required know-
ing whether it could obtain such approval before Bristol's patent expired. The
court also emphasized the public interest in obtaining early access to Zenith's
generic product, especially since Bristol had a monopoly on cefadroxil drugs.
Thus, because a declaratory judgment would serve these two \useful purposes,"
the court decided it would hear the suit.166
Another early declaratory judgment case regarding infringement under x 271(e)
was Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring A/S v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals Inc.167
Initially, Farmaceutisk sued Solvay for patent infringement and Solvay counter-
claimed, seeking a declaration of invalidity and non-infringement. After discov-
ery, Farmaceutisk realized all of Solvay's activities fell within the x 271(e)(1)
safe harbor and dismissed its infringement claims; however, Solvay sought to
maintain its declaratory judgment claims.168 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia began by setting out the declaratory judgment
doctrine described in Zenith.169 The court then explained that under the rst
prong of the Federal Circuit test, which requires reasonable apprehension of
suit by the patentee, an express charge of infringement is not required. If there
is no express infringement charge, the court must examine the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the plainti has a reasonable apprehension
of suit. In this case, because Farmaceutisk's infringement claims were dismissed
without prejudice and were dropped solely based on the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor,
Solvay had a reasonable apprehension of suit once its drug was approved and
the safe harbor no longer applied.170
165Id. at *7.
166Id. at *8.
16725 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
168Id. at 1346-47.
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31The court then explained that the second or \immediacy" prong of the Federal
Circuit test, which requires immediate intent and ability to infringe, was an is-
sue of degree to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, Solvay met the
\meaningful preparation" standard required for immediacy. Solvay had com-
mitted substantial resources to developing its drug, and it intended to diligently
prosecute an application for FDA approval until such approval was granted and
it could market its drug. The fact that Solvay had not yet actually led an
application for FDA approval was not determinative.171
The court then decided to exercise its discretion to hear the invalidity claim
but not the non-infringement claim. The patent itself was a \xed target," and a
ruling on its validity would clarify the positions of both Solvay and Farmaceutisk
in any future infringement dispute. However, Solvay's drug product had yet to
obtain FDA approval and could be changed or even set aside during the approval
process; thus the infringement issue was not ripe for determination. Solvay's
stipulation that it would not change its product between the time of suit and the
time of commercial marketing did not sway the court. Thus, the court declined
to hear the infringement issue but decided to hear the invalidity claim to clarify
Farmaceutisk's patent rights, allow Solvay to better assess its infringement risks,
and thus serve the Hatch-Waxman Act's purpose of encouraging investment in
the development and marketing of generic drugs.172
The Federal Circuit addressed declaratory judgment in the x 271(e) context
in Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.173 Telectronics sued
for a declaratory judgment that, upon FDA approval, Ventritex's sales of its
implantable debrillator would infringe Telectronics' patent. The district court
dismissed the suit and Telectronics appealed.174 The Federal Circuit began by
explaining that a patentee may seek a declaration that another party's future
conduct will infringe its patent. However, the plainti must present \sucient
171Id. at 1350.
172Id. at 1351-52.
173982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
174Id. at 1521.
32allegation of immediacy and reality" to prove that an actual case or controversy
exists and the court's jurisdiction is discretionary.175 The court held that the
evidence supported a decision that the immediacy prong of the actual case or
controversy test was not satised: Ventritex had just recently started clinical
trials, had already changed its product during testing, and was years away from
obtaining FDA approval. Thus, it was uncertain whether the device Ventritex
was currently testing would be the same one that received FDA approval and
was eventually marketed.176 Even if an actual case or controversy existed, the
district court did not clearly err in exercising its discretion to refuse to hear the
suit at such a preliminary stage. Thus, the court armed the district court's
summary judgment for defendant Ventritex.177
In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,178 the Federal Circuit again armed
a district court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment suit related to x 271(e).
Intermedics sought a declaratory judgment that Ventritex would infringe its
patent when it obtained FDA approval and began marketing its implantable
debrillator. The district court dismissed the claims because all of Ventritex's
activities were covered by the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor.179 The court framed the
actual case or controversy test as follows:
[T]he patentee... must show that the defendant [is] engaged in an activity
directed toward making, selling, or using subject to an infringement charge
under 35 U.S.C. s 271(a) (1982), or be making meaningful preparation for such
activity; and [the] acts of the defendant must indicate a refusal to change the
course of its actions in the face of acts by the patentee sucient to create a
reasonable apprehension that a suit will be forthcoming.180
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing the claims because no actual controversy existed: Ventritex had not
yet obtained FDA approval and might be required to change its device during
the approval process.181 Finally, the court reasoned that hearing Intermedics'
175Id. at 1526.
176Id. at 1527.
177Id.
178991 F.2d 808 (table, text in Westlaw), 1993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1791993 WL 87405 at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
180Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
181Id.
33declaratory judgment claim would undermine the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor: \[t]o
permit Ventritex to be protected from direct suit for infringement and yet allow
the same activities to be subject to suit in a declaratory judgment action would
be nonsensical."182
Since Intermedics,183 many courts have been reluctant to let declaratory judg-
ment suits go forward in the x 271(e) context. For example, in NeoRx Corp. v.
Immunomedics, Inc.184 the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied NeoRx's request for declaratory judgment that Immunomedics' infringed
NeoRx's patent by developing its technology for using antibodies to deliver ra-
dioactive labels to infection and tumor sites. The court held that NeoRx had
not made \sucient allegation of immediacy and reality" to satisfy the test for
an actual case or controversy, since it was unclear whether Immunomedics' tech-
nology would receive FDA approval and whether it would have to be altered to
obtain approval.185
In Abbott Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc.,186 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois similarly dismissed Abbott's suit for
declaratory judgment of infringement of its terazosin hydrochloride patent for
lack of justiciable controversy. Zenith's pursuit of FDA approval eective prior
to the patent's expiration date and its refusal to deny an intent to enter the
market before the patent expired were insucient evidence of the required im-
mediate ability and intent to infringe. Zenith's terazosin hydrochloride product
had not yet received FDA approval and it was possible that Zenith would change
its marketing plans. In addition, Zenith's continued defense of Abbott's lawsuits
was not sucient evidence of a denite intent to market a generic terazosin hy-
drochloride product to satisfy the actual controversy test.187 Finally, the court
explained that, even if there were a justiciable controversy, it would exercise
182Id.
1831993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
184877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994).
185Id. at 214.
186934 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
187Id. at 938.
34its discretion not to hear the case. The court cited Intermedics188 in reasoning
that allowing patentees to pursue this type of declaratory judgment suit against
a generic manufacturer before that manufacturer has obtained FDA approval
would undermine the safe harbor in x 271(e)(1).189
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts also dismissed
a declaratory judgment request in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc.190 Amgen sought a declaration that Hoechst would infringe its recom-
binant erythropoietin patent through the marketing of its own erythropoietin
product, which was still under development. The court found that there was
sucient case or controversy under the Federal Circuit's declaratory judgment
test: Hoechst clearly intended to market its erythropoietin product as soon as
possible, regardless of Amgen's patent claims, and Hoechst had the capacity
to bring its product to market immediately upon FDA approval.191 However,
the court chose to exercise its discretion not to hear the case. The court rea-
soned that FDA approval was still uncertain and Hoechst's product might be
altered during the approval process.192 The court also reiterated the concerns of
the Abbott and Intermedics courts that issuing a declaratory judgment in favor
of the patentee before the generic manufacturer received FDA approval might
derogate the congressional policy behind the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor, which
was intended to foster expeditious marketing of generic drugs: \the declaratory
action could easily become a tool of harassment and intimidation for use in dis-
couraging early eorts at competition."193 Thus, the court dismissed Amgen's
declaratory judgment claims. However, the court held that it would reopen the
claims for \good cause," including the issuance of an FDA product license for
Hoechst's erythropoietin product.194
1881993 WL 87405 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
189934 F. Supp. 925, 938-39 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
1903 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
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35Some courts have been more sympathetic to declaratory judgment suits in the
x 271(e) context, especially when the judgment is sought by the generic man-
ufacturer, the potential infringer, rather than the patentee. In these cases,
like the earlier Farmaceutisk195 case in which the Northern District of Georgia
allowed the invalidity declaratory judgment claims to go forward, the target
of the declaratory judgment is often a static patent, rather than a dynamic
technology under development. Additionally, a declaratory judgment in these
situations helps the generic manufacturer to assess the potential gains and risks
of its investment, but does not allow the patentee to assert its rights during the
developmental stage, which would seem to contradict the policy behind the x
271(e)(1) safe harbor.
In Innitech, Inc. v. Vitrophage, Inc.,196 the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois decided that it would hear Innitech's claims for a declara-
tory judgment that it had intervening rights under Vitrophage's liquid peruo-
rocarbon patent and that the patent was unenforceable. The court applied the
two-prong Federal Circuit test for sucient case or controversy in a declara-
tory judgment suit, nding that Innitech had reasonable apprehension of suit
and had undertaken meaningful preparations to produce an infringing prod-
uct.197 Even though Innitech had a good argument that all of its activities fell
within the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor, accusations of infringement in letters from
Vitrophage's counsel supported a reasonable apprehension of suit. Innitech's
huge investment in developing, testing, and seeking regulatory approval for its
liquid peruorocarbon product constituted meaningful preparation to produce
an infringing product under a totality of the circumstances analysis.198
The fact that Innitech's current activities were covered by the x 271(e)(1)
safe harbor and that it had yet to obtain FDA approval did not preclude the ex-
istence of an actual case or controversy. The court refused to endorse a rule that
\no actual controversy can exist if the declaratory plainti does not have the
19525 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
196842 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
197Id. at 336.
198Id at 336.
36present ability to market a potentially infringing product.199 The court distin-
guished Intermedics200 and Telectronics,201 cases in which the Federal Circuit
dismissed declaratory judgment suits because the generic manufacturer's con-
duct was exempt under x 271(e)(1), because those suits were brought by paten-
tees seeking declarations of infringement. In such cases, the goals of the Hatch-
Waxman and Declaratory Judgment Acts are not harmed by forcing a patentee
to wait to assert its rights until an infringer's activities actually fall outside the
x 271(e)(1) safe harbor; the patentees interests cannot be harmed at least until
the generic product receives FDA approval.202 However, a generic manufacturer
has an important interest in determining as early as possible whether a patent
that could be asserted against it is valid and enforceable. Thus,
[t]he court decline[d] to construe the Declaratory Judgment Act as placing
all of the burden and risk on those who would seek to develop new medical and
surgical products that require extensive development, investment, and clinical
testing on the road to the government approval necessary for actual marketing
and sale. Whether the declaratory plainti has `a true interest to be protected'...
should not depend on nal government approval in these circumstances.203
Even if the product Innitech eventually brought to market diered from
the version it was currently testing, the unenforceability and intervening rights
issues would remain the same. Thus, the court decided to hear Innitech's
declaratory judgment claims.204
In Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,205 Biogen sought a declaration that its beta
interferon multiple sclerosis drug did not infringe Schering's patent, and that the
patent was invalid. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found that a sucient case or controversy existed to give it jurisdiction over the
declaratory judgment suit. Schering's conduct, through its subsidiary Berlex
Laboratories, was sucient to invoke a reasonable apprehension of suit in Bio-
gen under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Berlex had asserted the
199Id. at 337.
200991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
201982 F.2d 1520 (Fed.Cir.1992).
202842 F. Supp. 332, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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204Id. at 338.
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37ability to use its patent to block Biogen's marketing of its beta interferon drug,
had sought but failed to negotiate a license with Biogen, and had even led suit
to thwart FDA approval of Biogen's drug.206 Biogen's submission of product for
foreign regulatory approval as well as its stock-piling of product in anticipation
of FDA approval took it outside the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor; thus, the court
dismissed the defendant's argument that Biogen could not have a reasonable
apprehension of suit because its activities before FDA were covered by the safe
harbor.207 Biogen's huge monetary investment in research and development of
its drug, stock-piling of product for marketing immediately upon FDA approval,
and other concrete and expensive steps in preparation for prompt marketing sat-
ised the \meaningful preparation" prong of the case or controversy test. The
court cited Innitech208 in explaining that lack of nal FDA approval does not
preclude a nding that a sucient case or controversy exists to allow a declara-
tory judgment suit to go forward.209 Thus, because Biogen had a reasonable
apprehension of suit and had made meaningful preparations toward producing
an infringing product, the court declined to dismiss Biogen's declaratory judg-
ment suit.210
In Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.211 the Federal Circuit showed a willing-
ness to hear a declaratory judgment suit by a patentee, even though it was
based partly on a generic manufacturer's actions that were still covered by the
x 271(e)(1) safe harbor. Glaxo sought a declaratory judgment that Novopharm
would infringe its ranitidine hydrochloride patent if and when Novopharm re-
ceived FDA approval for its generic ulcer treatment and began to import and
market the drug.212 The court found that a sucient case or controversy ex-
isted to allow the district court to hear Glaxo's declaratory judgment claims.
Although the x 271(e)(1) safe harbor currently protected some of Novopharm's
206Id. at 396.
207Id.
208842 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
209Id.
210Id. at 398.
211110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
212Id. at 1564.
38activities, this \protected status... d[id] not by itself prevent the district court
from considering Glaxo's request for declaratory relief because such relief is di-
rected to the time after the ANDA is approved, when s 271(e)(1) no longer
provides a shelter against infringement liability."213
Here, Glaxo's allegations that FDA approval of Novopharm's product was
imminent and that Novopharm expressly intended to market its product before
Glaxo's patent expired were sucient to support a nding of an actual case
or controversy.214 The court distinguished Telectronics,215 where it had dis-
missed a similar declaratory judgment suit by the patentee: in that case FDA
approval was unlikely to occur for years and there was some doubt surround-
ing the generic manufacturer's intent to market its product before the patent
expired.216 However, the court found no clear error in the district court's con-
clusion that Glaxo had not proven that Novopharm's drug would contain the
form of ranitidine hydrochloride covered by Glaxo's patent. Thus, the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of Glaxo's declaratory judgment on
the merits even though an actual case or controversy existed.217
Glaxo, along with the district court cases allowing declaratory judgment suits
by generic manufacturers to proceed, suggests that the declaratory judgment
suit will become an important tool for patentees and generic manufacturers to
determine their respective rights during the regulatory approval process. Glaxo
in particular suggests that the actual case or controversy hurdle may not pro-
vide a sucient screen against suits inconsistent with the policy behind the x
271(e)(1) safe harbor. Thus, generic manufacturers will have to rely on the
courts' discretion to allow early and meaningful determinations of generic and
pioneer manufacturers' rights where possible, while preventing the declaratory
suit from becoming \a tool of harassment and intimidation for use in discour-
aging early eorts at competition."218
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39E.
Orange Book Listing and Certication Procedures
21 U.S.C. x 355(b)(1)(F) requires anyone submitting an NDA to include
information about any patents that cover the new drug.219 FDA publishes
this patent information in its Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equiv-
alence Evaluations, also known as the \Orange Book." x 355(b)(2) and x
355(j)(2)(A)(vii) require anyone submitting an NDA that relies on data in an-
other NDA or an ANDA, which necessarily relies on data from the pioneer NDA,
to submit a \certication" with respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book
for the original NDA. The certication must specify (I) that no patent infor-
mation has been listed for the drug, (II) that the patent has expired, (III)
the patent's expiration date, or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be in-
fringed by the commercial manufacture and marketing of the ANDA applicant's
drug.220
x 355(j)(2)(B) requires any ANDA applicant who submits a certication of
21921 U.S.C. x 355 (b)(1)(F) (1994) provides that an NDA applicant:
shall le with the application the patent number and the expiration date of any patent
which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the application or which claims a
method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture,
use, or sale of the drug. If an application is led under this subsection for a drug and a
patent which claims such drug or a method of using such drug is issued after the ling date
but before approval of the application, the applicant shall amend the application to include
the information required by the receding sentence. Upon approval of the application, the
Secretary shall publish information submitted under the two preceding sentences.
22021 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(A) (1994) requires that every ANDA applicant submit the following:
(vii) a certication, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his knowledge, with
respect to each patent which claims the listed drug referred to in clause (i) or which claims a
use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection and
for which information is required to be led under subsection (b) or (c) of this section -
(I) that such patent information has not been led,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale
of the new drug for which the application is submitted....
21 U.S.C. x 355(b)(2) (1994) requires the same certication of an NDA applicant for any
\drug for which the investigations... relied upon by the applicant for approval of the applica-
tion were not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a
right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were conducted...."
40type IV, a \paragraph IV certication" to notify the patentee of the certied
patent and the marketing entity for the corresponding pioneer drug that an
ANDA has been submitted seeking approval for a generic drug before expira-
tion of the pioneer patent and to specify why the ANDA applicant believes the
certied patent is invalid or not infringed.221 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(2) makes ling
an NDA or ANDA seeking marketing approval before patent expiration into an
act of patent infringement.222 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B) completes the statutory
framework by allowing FDA to make approval of an ANDA containing a para-
graph IV eective immediately unless the patentee sues for infringement within
forty-ve days of receiving notice of the ANDA and its paragraph IV certica-
tion. If the patentee does sue, approval will be stayed for thirty months, or until
a court declares the patent invalid or not infringed.223
22135 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(B) (1994) mandates that:
(i) An applicant who makes a certication described in subparagraph (A)(vii)(IV) shall
include in the application a statement that the applicant will give the notice required by
clause (ii) to -
(I) each owner of the patent which is the subject of the certication or the representative
of such owner designated to receive such notice, and
(II) the holder of the approved application under subsection (b) of this section for the drug
which is claimed by the patent or a use of which is claimed by the patent or the representative
of such holder designated to receive such notice.
(ii) The notice referred to in clause (i) shall state that an application, which contains data
from bioavailability or bioequivalence studies, has been submitted under this subsection for
the drug with respect to which the certication is made to obtain approval to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of such drug before the expiration of the patent referred
to in the certication. Such notice shall include a detailed statement of the factual and legal
basis of the applicant's opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed.
22235 U.S.C. x 271(e)(2) (1994) provides that:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit... an application under section 505(j) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a
drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent... if the purpose of such
submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture,
use, or sale of a drug... claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before
the expiration of such patent.
22321 U.S.C. x (j)(5)(B) (1994) provides that:
(iii) If the applicant made a certication described in subclause (IV) of paragraph
(2)(A)(vii), the approval shall be made eective immediately unless an action is brought
for infringement of a patent which is the subject of the certication before the expiration
of forty-ve days from the date the notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) is received.
If such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made
eective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt
of the notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) or such shorter or longer period as the court
may order because either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action, except that -
(I) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that such patent is invalid or
not infringed, the approval shall be made eective on the date of the court decision,
(II) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that such patent has been
41In Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. v. Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,224
Marion Merrell Dow (MMD) accused Hoechst-Roussel (H-R) of infringing its
patents by submitting an NDA for a sustained release form of diltiazem, a heart
drug. H-R originally submitted a paragraph IV certication with respect to
MMD's patents; however, it later amended its NDA application to remove the
paragraph IV certication. H-R argued that the certication was not required
because H-R's NDA relied on only one study submitted in a prior NDA; that
study, involving \diltiazem itself," was included in the NDA for immediate re-
lease diltiazem, the patent on which had expired. Thus, H-R urged the court
to dismiss MMD's complaint for lack of justiciable controversy.225
The court found that, under x 355(b)(2)226 and x 271(e)(2)227 H-R had laid
itself open to an infringement suit by relying upon the study submitted for im-
mediate release diltiazem.228 H-R's removal of the paragraph IV certications
for MMD's patents from its NDA was not determinative.229 In setting out an
infringement cause of action, x 271(e)(2) does not require certication, it just
requires that the pioneer patent claim the drug, or its use, described in the
subsequent NDA or ANDA. Additionally, the pioneer patentee's rights under x
271(e)(2) would be meaningless if the patentee had to rely on subsequent NDA
and ANDA applicants' candor in certication in order to assert them. Thus, the
court concluded that the proper inquiry to determine whether the x 271(e)(2)
suit could go forward was whether the patents should have been certied.230
In deciding whether H-R should have certied MMD's patent, the court noted
infringed, the approval shall be made eective on such date as the court orders under section
271(e)(4)(A) of title 35, or
(III) if before the expiration of such period the court grants a preliminary injunction pro-
hibiting the applicant from engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of the drug until
the court decides the issues of patent validity and infringement and if the court decides that
such patent is invalid or not infringed, the approval shall be made eective on the date of such
court decision.
In such an action, each of the parties shall reasonably cooperate in expediting the action....
2241994 WL 424207 (D.N.J. 1994).
225Id. at *1.
226See supra note 220.
227See supra note 222.
2281994 WL 424207 at *2 (D.N.J. 1994).
229Id.
230Id.
42that x 355(b)(2)(A) requires certication for \each patent which claims the
drug for which such investigations [those relied upon by the subsequent appli-
cant] were conducted." In H-R's own words, it had relied on a study of \dil-
tiazem itself"; thus, the \drug for which [the] investigations were conducted"
was diltiazem, not just immediate release diltiazem. The plain meaning of the
statute required H-R to certify any patent covering diltiazem, including MMD's
patents on the sustained release form.231 Thus, because H-R should have certi-
ed MMD's patents, the court refused to dismiss MMD's claims.232
In Abbott Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc.,233 Zenith argued that
the court should dismiss Abbott's suit for infringement under x 271(e)(2) be-
cause Abbott had not listed its terazosin hydrochloride patent in the NDA for
its drug Hytrin as required under x 355(b)(1). Thus, Zenith maintained that
its ANDA for a generic version of Hytrin was not required to certify Abbott's
patent and that Abbott should not be allowed to assert its patent against Zenith
under x 271(e)(2).234 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois agreed with Zenith, rejecting Abbott's argument that the plain language of
x 271(e)(2),235 which does not expressly refer to patent listing or certication,
allows an infringement suit against an ANDA applicant who had no notice of
the patent that covers its drug because the pioneer NDA applicant failed to
properly list the patent with FDA.236 The court held that x 271(e)(2) expressly
refers to applications under xx 355(b) and (j), and thus must be read in conjunc-
tion with those provisions as a whole to require that a patent be listed for an
NDA before the pioneer patentee may assert it against a subsequent applicant
for FDA approval. The court also reasoned that requiring ANDA applicants
to address patents not listed by the pioneer drug manufacturer would under-
mine the Hatch-Waxman Act's purpose of promoting expeditious marketing of
231Id. at *3.
232Id. at *4.
2331995 WL 117984 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
234Id. at *6.
235See supra note 222.
2361995 WL 117984 at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
43generic drugs. Thus, the court dismissed Abbott's claims.237
Abbott later amended its NDA application to list its patent and the patent was
published in the Orange Book. However, in a subsequent opinion,238 the court
held that Abbott still could not assert its patent against Zenith's ANDA be-
cause Abbott's amendment was not timely and Zenith's ANDA was led before
the amendment was made. 21 U.S.C. x 355(c)(2) requires that an NDA holder
who, like Abbott, did not list a patent in its NDA because the patent had not
yet issued, must le the patent information with FDA within thirty days after
the patent issues. Abbott did not report its patent to FDA within the required
thirty-day period.239
The statute provides no explicit guidance about what is required of ANDA
applicants when the NDA holder is delinquent in listing its newly-issued patent.
However, FDA's regulation at 21 C.F.R. x 314.94(a)(12)(vi) (1995) species
that if a newly-issued patent is not listed within the required thirty-day period,
ANDA applicants need not amend previously-submitted ANDA applications to
certify the patent; only applicants submitting future ANDAs for the drug must
certify the untimely-listed patent.240 This regulation prevents the disruption of
the ANDA process that would occur if ANDA applicants were required to amend
pending applications to address untimely-led patents. Thus, the court felt that
the regulation furthered the statutory concerns, rst, that the Orange Book give
notice to ANDA applicants of any patents covering their generic drugs and, sec-
ond, that generic drugs quickly be made widely available at low prices.241 Since
Zenith's ANDA was led before Abbott's untimely patent listing, the regula-
tion did not require Zenith to amend its ANDA application to certify Abbott's
patent. As in its earlier opinion, the court reasoned that x 271(e)(2) only allows
infringement suits against patents that are properly listed and therefore must
be certied under x 355 (b) or (j). Zenith was not required to certify Abbott's
237Id. at *10-11.
238Abbott Laboratories v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
239Id. at 932.
240Id. at 935.
241Id.
44patent, so Abbott could not maintain its infringement suit under x 271(e)(2).242
Thus, Abbott could not assert its patent rights until Zenith began commercially
marketing its drugs and lost the benet of the safe harbor under x 271(e)(1).243
In Pzer, Inc. v. FDA,244 the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland
addressed the provisions in 21 U.S.C. xx 355(b)(1)(F) and (c)(2) requiring NDA
applicants to le patent information for any patent that \claims the drug for
which the applicant submitted the application." Each of these patents \claims
the listed drug" in the NDA and must therefore be certied by ANDA applicants
under 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). Pzer sought an order compelling FDA to
list patents on an unapproved tablet form of its approved drug nifedipine, such
that ANDA applicants would be required to certify the patents, allowing Pzer
to sue them under 35 U.S.C. x 271(e)(2).245 In support of its position, Pzer
argued that \drug" in xx 355(b)(1)(F) and (c)(2) is broad enough to cover the
drug substance or active ingredient, and not just the drug product approved
under the NDA. FDA refused to publish Pzer's patent, arguing that \drug"
in these provisions is limited to the \drug product" for which the NDA was
led.246 Because Pzer had never led or received approval for an NDA for the
tablet form of nifedipine, FDA could not list patents covering this form of the
drug. Even if FDA did publish the patents on the tablet form of nifedipine,
ANDA applicants would not be required to certify those patents because they
do not pertain to the \listed" drug, which was the approved capsule form of
nifedipine.247
The court found FDA's interpretation reasonable and consistent with the statu-
tory language, congressional intent, previous court opinions addressing x 355,
and FDA's own regulations.248 The court explained that the denition of \drug"
in 21 U.S.C. x 321(g)(1) is broad enough to cover a nal drug product as well
242Id. at 936.
243Id. at 939.
244753 F. Supp. 171 (D. Md. 1990).
245Id.
246Id.
247Id. at 174-75.
248Id. at 175.
45as its active ingredients. However, \drug" in xx 355(b)(1) and (c)(2) is modi-
ed by the phrase \for which the applicant submitted the application." FDA's
interpretation comports with this qualifying phrase: Pzer had submitted an
NDA for nifedipine capsules, not nifedipine in general or the tablet formulation
covered by the patents at issue.249
The court also noted that FDA's interpretation of \drug" fostered internal con-
sistency within the Hatch-Waxman Act. Other provisions in x 355(b) using the
word \drug" made sense if \drug" meant \drug product," but not if it meant
\active ingredient." Further, FDA was correct that ANDA applicants need only
certify patents for \listed drugs," drugs on FDA's list of approved products;
while nifedipine capsules were a \listed drug," nifedipine tablets were not.250
FDA's interpretation of \drug" was also consistent with the dual congressional
intent of expediting the generic drug approval process, yet still providing su-
cient incentives for investment in pioneer drugs. Since Pzer had not beneted
ANDA applicants or consumers by obtaining approval for nifedipine tablets, the
patents covering these tablets deserved no special protection.251 The court also
noted that Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman provisions with full knowledge
of FDA's interpretation of \drug" under x 355 as the product for which approval
is sought; this suggested Congress' acquiescence in the interpretation. Thus, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of FDA.252
In Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp.,253 the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey denied Ben Venue's request for
a preliminary injunction compelling Novartis to remove a patent from FDA's
Orange Book. Novartis' approved bone loss drug Aredia contained the active
ingredient pamidronate disodium, while the patent covered only the pentahy-
drate form of pamidronate. Thus, Ben Venue argued that the patent did not
\claim" Aredia and was improperly listed under x 355(b); further, the incor-
249Id. at 176.
250Id. at 176-77.
251Id. at 177.
252Id. at 178.
25310 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 1998).
46rect listing had wrongly forced Ben Venue to certify the patent and suer the
resulting thirty-month stay of ANDA approval when Novartis sued for infringe-
ment.254 The court began by holding that Ben Venue's suit was not barred
by the provision in 35 U.S.C. x 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii) prohibiting suits under the
Declaratory Judgment Act \with respect to the patent" in the rst forty-ve
days after the patentee receives notice of a paragraph IV certication. Reading
the statute in light of its statutory context and legislative purpose, the court
decided that suits \with respect to the patent" under x 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) referred
only to suits regarding patent validity and infringement. Thus, although Ben
Venue's suit was led less than forty-ve days after it gave Novartis notice of its
paragraph IV certication, the suit was not barred because it raised only the
issue of proper Orange Book listing.255
The court then turned to the factors that must weigh in favor of relief for a
court to grant a declaratory judgment, beginning with likelihood of success on
the merits. Ben Venue's success on the merits depended on the interpretation
of the provision in 21 U.S.C. x 355(b)(1) requiring NDA applicants to le patent
information for \any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant sub-
mitted the application."256 Ben Venue relied on Pzer257 for the proposition
that \drug" in x 355(b)(1) means only \approved drug product," and thus No-
vartis' patent on a related active ingredient that was absent from the nal drug
product was improperly listed.258 The court rejected BenVenue's argument.
Pzer was distinguished, rst, as involving an attempt to list a patent for a
new, unapproved product merely because it contained the same active ingredi-
ent as an approved product and, second, as occurring before FDA promulgated
its full formal regulations on patent listing under x 355(b)(1).259
FDA's 1994 regulations at 21 C.F.R. x 314.53(b) address the types of patents
that should be listed under x 355(b)(1):
254Id. at 450.
255Id. at 451.
256Id. at 453-54.
257753 F. Supp. 171 (D. Md. 1990).
25810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454-55 (D.N.J. 1998).
259Id. at 455.
47For purposes of this part, such patents consist of drug substance (ingredient)
patents, drug product (formulation and composition) patents, and method of
use patents.... For patents that claim a drug substance or drug product, the
applicant shall submit information only on those patents that claim a drug
product that is the subject of a pending or approved application, or that claim
a drug substance that is a component of such a product.
The regulations make clear that certain drug substance (active ingredient)
patents may be listed. The court upheld FDA's regulation as a permissible
interpretation of the statute, thus ruling against Ben Venue's argument that only
patents on the specic approved drug product can be listed.260 The court then
undertook to determine whether Novartis' patent was properly listed because
the patented drug substance was a \component" of Aredia even though it was
not present in the nal approved drug product.261
The court held that FDA's interpretation of \component" and common un-
derstandings of the term do not require that a \component" be present unaltered
in the nal product.262 FDA's good manufacturing regulations at 21 C.F.R. x
210.3(b) specically dene \component" to include any manufacturing ingredi-
ent, even if it is not present in the nal product. That section further denes
\active ingredient" to include components present only in modied form in the
nal drug product. At 21 C.F.R. x 60.3(b)(2), FDA denes \active ingredi-
ent" identically for the patent restoration provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
FDA's NDA regulations at 21 C.F.R. x 314.50(d)(1)(ii) also refer to \compo-
nents used in the manufacture of the drug product (regardless of whether they
appear in the drug product)." Clearly, the need for a consistent regulatory
scheme supported FDA's interpretation of \drug" in the x 355(b)(1) context.263
Thus, the court held that under 21 C.F.R. x 314.53(b), a \drug substance" or
\active ingredient" can be a \component" of a drug product even if it does not
appear unaltered in the nal product. In this case, the pentahydrate form of
pamidronate was an ingredient in the manufacture of the approved drug Aredia.
260Id.
261Id.
262Id. at 456.
263Id. at 457.
48Thus, the patented drug substance was a \component" of the approved drug
product and Novartis had properly listed the patent. Ben Venue's motion for a
preliminary injunction would be denied because it had little likelihood of success
on the merits.264
Despite a nding of little likelihood of success on the merits, the court went
on to address the other relevant factors for preliminary injunctive relief. The
economic harm from the thirty-month stay in FDA approval asserted by Ben
Venue was insucient to warrant injunctive relief.265 However, Novartis' abil-
ity to assert its patent rights would be harmed and the statutory protection
for pioneer drug patentees would be undermined if the court ruled in favor of
Ben Venue; thus the balance of hardships weighed against a preliminary injunc-
tion. In addition, the public interest in enforcing the statutory and regulatory
scheme of the Hatch-Waxman weighed against relief. Thus, the court denied
Ben Venue's motion for a preliminary injunction.266
IV. Litigation of the Generic Exclusivity Period in 21 U.S.C. x 355
A.
The Successful Defense Requirement
21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) creates a 180-day market exclusivity period
for the rst generic manufacturer to le a paragraph IV certication for a given
drug.267 Under this provision, subsequent ANDAs containing paragraph IV cer-
tications cannot be approved until 180 days after either the rst commercial
marketing of the drug (the \commercial marketing trigger"), or a court decision
264Id. at 458.
265Id.
266Id. at 459.
26721 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B) (1994) provides that:
(iv) If the application contains a certication described in subclause (IV) of paragraph
(2)(A)(vii) and is for a drug for which a previous application has been submitted under this
subsection continuing such a certication, the application shall be made eective not earlier
than one hundred and eighty days after -
(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under the previous application
of the rst commercial marketing of the drug under the previous application, or (II) the date
of a decision of a court in an action described in clause (iii) holding the patent which is the
subject of the certication to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier.
49holding the patent invalid or not infringed (the \court decision trigger"). The
FDA regulations under this provision also required that the rst applicant suc-
cessfully defend a patent infringement suit before the market exclusivity period
can begin (the \successful defense" requirement).268
In Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala,269 Mova challenged the validity of
the successful defense requirement. Mova led the rst ANDA with a paragraph
IV certication for generic micronized glyburide and was sued by Upjohn, the
pioneer patentee. While this litigation was pending, Mylan submitted an ANDA
for micronized glyburide and amended it to include a paragraph IV certication.
However, Upjohn did not sue Mylan within forty-ve days of receiving notice
of the paragraph IV certication as required under 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)
in order to stay approval for thirty months, so FDA approved Mylan's appli-
cation.270 Mova successfully sought a preliminary injunction ordering FDA to
render approval of Mylan's ANDA eective no earlier than 180 days after Mova
began commercial marketing of its micronized glyburide or won the infringe-
ment suit brought against it by Upjohn.271
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit began by ex-
plaining FDA's rationale for the successful defense requirement: a literal inter-
pretation of the x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) produces unreasonable results contrary to
congressional intent if the rst applicant either is never sued or loses its suit.
If the rst applicant is not sued, the court decision trigger cannot be satised
26821 C.F.R. x 314.107(c)(1) (1997) stated:
If an abbreviated new drug application contains a certication that a relevant patent is
invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed and the application is for a generic copy of the
same listed drug for which one or more substantially complete abbreviated new drug applica-
tions were previously submitted containing a certication that the same patent was invalid,
unenforceable, or would not be infringed and the applicant submitting the rst application
has successfully defended against a suit for patent infringement brought within 45 days of the
patent owner's receipt of notice submitted under s 314.95, approval of the subsequent abbre-
viated new drug application will be made eective no sooner than 180 days from whichever
of the following dates is earlier:
(i) The date the applicant submitting the rst application rst commences commercial mar-
keting of its drug product; or
(ii) The date of a decision of the court holding the relevant patent invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed.
(emphasis added).
269140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
270Id. at 1065.
271Id. at 1065-66.
50and later ANDA applicants will be forced to wait for the rst applicant to begin
marketing its product to trigger the exclusivity period.272 However, failure to
obtain FDA approval of production facilities or a collusive agreement with the
pioneer manufacturer might cause the rst applicant to wait indenitely to mar-
ket its product. If the rst applicant loses its suit, it obviously cannot satisfy
the court decision trigger; in addition, it will never satisfy the commercial mar-
keting trigger because a court has held that such marketing would constitute
patent infringement. Thus, the successful defense requirement was designed to
prevent these scenarios, which would preclude marketing of any generic product
until after the pioneer patent expired. Because a rst applicant who is not sued
or loses its suit has not \successfully defended against a suit for patent infringe-
ment,"273 it would not be eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period; thus, other
generic manufacturers would be free to seek FDA approval and enter the market
as early as possible, just as Congress intended.274
The D.C. Circuit cited Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.275 for the proposition that an agency attempting to interpret a
statute to avoid absurd results produced by a literal reading may deviate only as
far from the statutory language as is required to honor congressional intent.276
In this situation, the court believed that the successful defense requirement de-
viated further than necessary from the statute: \FDA has embarked upon an
adventurous transplant operation in response to blemishes in the statute that
could have been alleviated with more modest corrective surgery."277 The court
noted that one less-restrictive option would be to require subsequent applicants
to \wait and see" whether the rst applicant was sued and won its suit. An-
other possibility would be to allow any court decision holding the pioneer patent
invalid or not infringed, not just a court decision in the suit against the rst
272Id. at 1067.
27321 C.F.R. x 314.107(c)(1) (1997).
274140 F.3d 1060, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
275467 U.S. 837 (1984).
276140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
277Id. at 1069.
51ANDA applicant, to satisfy the court decision trigger.278 A third alternative
would be to require a rst applicant who is not sued to begin commercial mar-
keting within a set period of time in order to obtain the market exclusivity
period.279 To solve the problem of rst applicants who lose their suits, FDA
could require such applicants to amend their ANDAs to replace the paragraph
IV certication with a paragraph III certication, which does not seek approval
until after the pioneer patent expires. Since only applicants whose ANDAs con-
tain paragraph IV certications are entitled to an exclusivity period, the rst
applicant would no longer pose a barrier to FDA approval of other ANDAs con-
taining paragraph IV certications.280
The court went on to explain that the successful defense requirement did more
that just contradict the plain meaning of the statute by creating an additional
obstacle to obtaining market exclusivity beyond those explicitly required; the
successful defense requirement also essentially eviscerated the commercial mar-
keting trigger to the detriment of the rst ANDA applicant. Until a rst appli-
cant won its infringement suit, commencement of commercial marketing would
not allow its exclusivity period to begin and other generic manufacturers could
seek FDA approval and enter the market. However, once the rst applicant
won its suit, its 180 days of exclusivity would be counted from the date it be-
gan commercial marketing, if that occurred before the suit was concluded. The
court found this one-sided reading of the commercial marketing trigger against
the rst ANDA applicant contrary to congressional intent.281 Because the suc-
cessful defense requirement contradicted the plain statutory language, created
problems in the functioning of the statutory scheme, and went further than nec-
essary to implement congressional intent, the D.C. Circuit armed the district
court's invalidation of the requirement.282
In compliance with the district court injunction in Mova,283 FDA awarded
278Id at 1072-73.
279Id. at 1071.
280Id.
281Id. at 1070.
282Id. at 1076.
283955 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C.1997).
52market exclusivity to Genpharm, the rst applicant whose ANDA contained
a paragraph IV certication seeking to market a generic ulcer drug. Granutec,
Genpharm's competitor who had led a subsequent ANDA for the same drug,
brought suit seeking an injunction compelling FDA to follow the successful de-
fense requirement and deny Genpharm the exclusivity period. Although the dis-
trict court ruled in Granutec's favor, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's injunction against FDA and invalidated
the successful defense requirement in an unpublished opinion in Granutec, Inc.
v. Shalala.284 The court's reasoning was similar to that of the D.C. Circuit
in Mova285: the successful defense requirement undesirably rendered the com-
mercial marketing trigger superuous and constituted an impermissible extra
requirement for exclusivity beyond those explicitly provided for by Congress.286
In response to Mova287 and Granutec288 FDA revised its position, informing
the industry that, at least until the completion of new rulemaking proceedings
on the subject, it would award a 180-day market exclusivity period to the rst
applicant to submit a substantially complete ANDA containing a paragraph
IV certication, regardless of whether that applicant had been sued for patent
infringement. However, FDA urged that rst applicants market their prod-
ucts promptly once approved.289 In November, 1998, FDA issued an interim
rule amending its regulations to remove the successful defense requirement.290
In Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Friedman,291 Purepac argued that FDA's
amendments were impermissibly broad: although FDA was required to remove
the successful defense requirement, it should have retained a requirement that
a rst applicant be sued in order to obtain a market exclusivity period. Thus,
Purepac alleged that its competitor Torpharm, who had not been sued, should
284139 F.3d 889 (table, text in Westlaw), 1998 WL 153410 (4th Cir. 1998).
285140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2861998 WL 153410 at *6-7 (4th Cir. 1998).
287140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
288139 F.3d 889 (table, text in Westlaw), 1998 WL 153410 (4th Cir. 1998).
289See Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
29063 Fed. Reg. 59,710 (1998).
291162 F.3d 1201, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
53not be entitled to market exclusivity.292 The D.C. Circuit rejected Purepac's
arguments, holding that FDA's current position was a rational response to the
Mova decision and was completely consistent with the statutory provisions of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which makes no reference to the type of \lawsuit re-
quirement" favored by Purepac.293
B.
The Court Decision Trigger
After invalidating the successful defense requirement, the Fourth Circuit in
Granutec294 was required to determine the starting date for Genpharm's 180
days of market exclusivity. Because Genpharm had not commenced commercial
marketing, the exclusivity period began on the date that the court decision
trigger was satised, \the date of a decision of a court... holding the patent...
invalid or not infringed."295 FDA's regulations dened \a decision of a court" as
a \nal judgment from which no appeal can be or has been taken"; the \date"
of such nal decision was \the date of the rst decision or order by a higher
court" arming a district court holding of invalidity or non-infringement or,
if no appeal was taken, \the date on which the right to appeal lapse[d]."296
Further, FDA interpreted \a decision of a court" to mean a ruling by any court
on the disputed patent, not just a decision by the court in the infringement suit
against the ANDA applicant whose exclusivity period would be triggered.297
The Fourth Circuit held that FDA's interpretations of the court decision trigger
were permissible readings of an ambiguous statutory provision.298
The court explained that \a decision" could mean either a district court
judgment or an appellate ruling, and \a court" could mean \the court" or \any
292Id.
293Id. at 1204-1205.
294139 F.3d 889 (table, text in Westlaw), 1998 WL 153410 (4th Cir. 1998).
29521 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (1994).
29621 C.F.R. x 314.107(e) (1997).
2971998 WL 153410 at *8 (4th Cir. 1998).
298Id. at *8-9.
54court"; each interpretation would create problems in applying the statutory
scheme.299 FDA's interpretation would seemingly deny a rst applicant the
benet of part of its exclusivity period by allowing the period to begin while
the applicant was still waiting for the infringement suit against it to be re-
solved; however, the rst applicant could still prot by waiving its exclusivity
in favor of another generic manufacturer in exchange for payment by that man-
ufacturer. The interpretation urged by Genpharm, that \a court" means \the
court" involved in the infringement suit against the generic manufacturer enti-
tled to exclusivity assures that manufacturer the full benet of its exclusivity
period. Unfortunately, this interpretation would allow pioneer drug manufac-
turers to capture the generic market: for example, the pioneer manufacturer
could settle its case with the rst ANDA applicant, such that the court de-
cision trigger could never be satised, and then pay that applicant to refrain
from marketing its generic product, such that the commercial marketing trig-
ger could also never be met.300 The court found this possibility \antithetical
to the very purpose of the exclusivity incentive and the entire ANDA regime,"
which was designed to make low cost generic drugs more widely available.301
\A situation where no generic can come to market because the pioneer has im-
posed a stranglehold by gaining entitlement to an exclusive marketing period
for its captured generic, yet never exercises that right, could not have been
contemplated by Congress."302 Recognizing the careful balance and intricate
framework involved in the statutory drug approval scheme, the court decided to
defer to FDA's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous statutory provision
setting out the court decision trigger.303
Teva Pharmaceuticals, wishing to market its generic version of a treatment for
stroke victims, decided to test FDA's interpretation of the court decision trig-
ger.304 One of Teva's competitors was entitled to 180 days of market exclusivity;
299Id.
300Id. at *9.
301Id.
302Id.
303Id.
304See Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
55Teva hoped to trigger the start of the exclusivity period so that it would pass
and the market would be open for other generic products as soon as possible.
Rather than wait for a suit between the patentee and the generic manufacturer
entitled to exclusivity, Teva decided to bring its own declaratory judgment suit
for non-infringement against the patentee. This suit was dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction after the patentee admitted non-infringement; how-
ever, FDA refused to recognize the dismissal as a court decision sucient to
trigger the market exclusivity period for the stroke drug.305 In Teva Pharma-
ceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA,306 the D.C. Circuit found FDA's refusal arbitrary
and capricious, since FDA had taken an inconsistent position in a previous case
and had failed to explain the inconsistency; thus, the court remanded for a de-
termination of whether injunctive relief was appropriate.
Teva argued that the dismissal of the declaratory judgment suit was equivalent
to a nal court decision of noninfringement: the suit was dismissed because
the court found that Teva had no reasonable apprehension of being sued for
patent infringement, and thus there was no justiciable case or controversy, in
light of an express written promise by the patentee that it would not sue.307
FDA conceded that the statute, which requires a \decision of a court holding the
patent... invalid or not infringed,"308 did not mandate its position. A \decision"
can include a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and \holding" is
an ambiguous term. The court reasoned that, often, the key to a \decision"
or \holding" is its preclusive eect. While most dismissals for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction have no preclusive eect, the dismissal here rested \exclu-
sively and necessarily" on the patentee's express admission of non-infringement
and promise not to sue."309 Thus, from the dismissing court's point of view,
no declaratory judgment was required, because the patentee was estopped from
asserting that Teva's marketing of its generic product constituted patent in-
305Id.
306182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
307Id. at 1006.
30821 U.S.C. x 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (1994).
309182 F.3d 1003, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
56fringement.310 The court concluded that:
Although the dismissal was not a judgment on the merits after consideration
of evidence presented by the parties, there was no need for such a procedure
here because the dismissal suced to estop [the patentee] from suing Teva for
patent infringement.... This is the result that appears to be the purpose of the
triggering \court decision" provision.311
The court analyzed FDA's position in light of its June, 1998 Guidance for
Industry,312 which announced that the agency would \regulate directly from
the statute" on a \case-by-case basis" until it could comprehensively address
the triggering of the generic market exclusivity period in a new rulemaking.
Based on this guidance pronouncement, the court found FDA's position re-
garding Teva arbitrary and capricious.313 Since the dismissal could qualify as
a triggering \court decision" under the statutory language and FDA had an-
nounced its intent to regulate on a \case-by-case basis," the court found FDA's
refusal to even consider Teva's position unjustiable. The court specically
criticized FDA's unexplained refusal of Teva's position as inconsistent with its
recognition of a partial grant of summary judgment based on the patentee's
admission of non-infringement as a \court decision" in Granutec.314 The court
was also unable to reconcile FDA's position regarding Teva with its promise to
\regulate directly from the statute": Teva's position was consistent with the
statute's language as well as its goal of making generic drugs widely available as
early as possible, yet FDA had provided no rationale for its rejection of Teva's
arguments. Thus, the court remanded for a determination of whether injunctive
relief against FDA was in order.315
On remand, the D.C. District Court reviewed the entire record, including the
appellate court's decision, and decided that FDA's refusal of Teva's position
was arbitrary and capricious.316 FDA argued that it refused to recognize the
310Id.
311Id. at 1009 (citation omitted).
312U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: 180-Day Generic
Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act 4 (1998).
313182 F.3d 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
3141998 WL 153410, at *5 (4th Cir. 1998).
315182 F.3d 1003, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
316Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 1999 Westlaw 1042743 (D.D.C. 1999).
57dismissal of Teva's declaratory judgment suit as satisfying the court decision
trigger because it was not obvious from the face of the court order that the
patent had been held invalid or not infringed. It would be too burdensome to
require FDA personnel to make a thorough substantive review of every court
order submitted to the agency in order to determine whether the order satised
the court decision trigger.317 The court rejected this argument, nding that the
administrative burden required to determine the estoppel eect of the order in
Teva's case would be minimal.318 The court also noted that FDA had failed
to adequately explain the discrepancy between its treatment of Teva and its
treatment of the partial dismissal of summary judgment at issue in Granutec;
since both court orders estopped the patentee from suing for infringement, they
should be treated equally for purposes of the court decision trigger provision.319
Thus, the court held that Teva's drug was entitled to \immediate nal eective
approval" by FDA.320
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Shalala,321 the D.C. District Court again
addressed FDA's interpretation of the date of the court decision trigger as the
date of an appellate court decision arming a district court holding of invalidity
or non-infringement or, if no appeal is taken, the date that the right to appeal
lapses.322 Mylan could not market its generic hypertension and prostate drug
until its competitor Geneva had enjoyed 180 days of market exclusivity; thus,
Mylan supported the earliest possible start date for Geneva's market exclusiv-
ity period. Mylan argued that the statute mandated that the exclusivity period
begin on the date of the rst district court decision holding the patent invalid or
not infringed.323 The court agreed with Mylan: the plain, unambiguous mean-
ing of the phrase \decision of a court" in x 355(j)(B)(iv)(II) included a decision
by a district court, whether appealed or not.324 The court specically rejected
317Id. at *5.
318Id.
319Id. at *6.
320Id. at *7.
3212000 WL 19250 (D.D.C. 2000).
322See 21 C.F.R. x 314.107(e) (1999).
3232000 WL 19250 at *5 (D.D.C. 2000).
324Id. at *6-7.
58the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in Granutec325 that the statutory language was
ambiguous and thus the court should defer to the agency's reasonable interpre-
tation of the law.326
The court explained that FDA's interpretation was grounded in its belief that
prudent generic manufacturers would be unwilling to market their products until
the patent infringement issue was fully resolved on appeal. These manufactur-
ers would be denied the full benet of their exclusivity period if it began on
the date of the district court decision.327 The court was not convinced that
allowing a district court decision to act as the court decision trigger would
diminish the exclusivity period incentive enough to harm the Hatch-Waxman
Act's goal of making generic drugs available quickly and at reasonable prices.
The court also noted that, while the exclusivity period provided an incentive
for the rst generic manufacturer, delaying the period's onset prevented other
generic products from entering the market as early as possible. Thus, because
a literal interpretation of the statute would not clearly conict with Congres-
sional intent or create an unworkable regulatory framework, the court issued
a declaratory judgment rejecting FDA's interpretation in favor of the reading
supported by Mylan.328
In TorPharm, Inc. v. Shalala,329 the D.C. District Court had made a similar
nding regarding the type of court decision that can terminate the thirty-month
stay of FDA approval for an ANDA applicant who is sued by the pioneer man-
ufacturer. TorPharm led a paragraph IV certication for Glaxo's patent in its
ANDA for ranitidine hydrochloride. Torpharm notied Glaxo as required and
Glaxo sued TorPharm for infringement within forty-ve days. Thus, 21 U.S.C. x
355(4)(B)(iii) required that the ANDA's \approval shall be made eective upon
the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt
of the notice [of the paragraph IV certication]... except that... if before the
325139 F.3d 889 (table, text in Westlaw), 1998 WL 153410 at *8-9 (4th Cir. 1998).
3262000 WL 19250 at *7 (D.D.C. 2000).
327Id. at *9.
328Id. at *11.
3291997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21983 (D.D.C. 1997), appeal withdrawn and remanded, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4681 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated No. 97-1925 (D.D.C. 1998).
59expiration of such period the court decides that such patent is invalid or not
infringed, the approval may be eective on the date of the court decision."
The Illinois district court granted summary judgment for TorPharm in Glaxo's
infringement suit. TorPharm then sued for a preliminary injunction compelling
FDA to make approval of its ANDA eective on the date of the district court's
decision.330 FDA would have delayed approval under its regulations at 21 C.F.R.
x 314.107(e), which dened \the court decision" under x 344(4)(B)(iii) as \a nal
judgment from which no appeal can be or has been taken." As in Mylan, FDA
justied its regulations as protecting the prudent ANDA applicant who would
wait for an appellate court decision to begin marketing its generic product.331
However, the court rejected FDA's interpretation and held that a district court
decision qualied as a court decision that could end the thirty-month stay of ap-
proval under x 355(4)(B)(iii): \[t]he natural meaning of the statute's reference to
`the court' is `the court that decides that the patent is invalid or not infringed.'
That court in this case was the [district court]. The district court's decision has
a binding eect on the parties unless stayed or overturned on appeal."332 The
court also noted that its interpretation was consistent with the legislative pol-
icy of getting generic drugs to market quickly.333 Although this case was later
vacated on other grounds, it gives added force to the court's holding in Mylan.334
C.
Dosage Level
The issue of whether multiple market exclusivity periods could be granted
for dierent dosage levels of the same drug arose in Apotex, Inc. v. Sha-
lala.335 Apotex sued to enjoin FDA from granting an exclusivity period to its
competitor Novopharm for generic over-the-counter (OTC) strength ranitidine
3301997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21983 at *4 (D.D.C. 1997).
331Id. at *11.
332Id. at *8.
333Id. at *12.
3342000 WL 19250 (D.D.C. 2000).
33553 F. Supp. 2d 454 (D.D.C. 1999).
60hydrochloride, because an exclusivity period had already been awarded for the
prescription strength of the drug.336 21 U.S.C. x 355(j)(2) requires an ANDA
applicant to reference the approved pioneer drug product or \listed drug" that it
will duplicate and submit data demonstrating that the \route of administration,
the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug are the same as those of the
listed drug" (emphasis added). Thus, FDA asserts that dierent strengths of
the same drug product constitute dierent listed drugs which are in turn eligible
for separate generic market exclusivity periods.337
Apotex argued that only one exclusivity period should be granted for each
patent challenged. Novopharm took on no additional risk by ling its ANDA for
OTC ranitidine hydrochloride since it had already litigated the relevant patent
in connection with its prescription strength ANDA; thus, Novopharm deserved
no additional reward for ling the OTC ANDA.338 In response, FDA reasoned
that dierent strengths of the same drug could represent dierent formulations,
and thus present dierent issues in a patent infringement analysis. The court
agreed with FDA, noting also that the statute clearly does not mandate that
only one exclusivity period be granted per challenged patent.339 Even if the
statute were ambiguous, the court found that FDA's interpretation was rea-
sonable and therefore required deference by the court. FDA's interpretation
furthered the statutory goal by creating incentives for market entry by a large
variety of generic drug products; in contrast, Apotex's interpretation would im-
pose an unduly strict limit of one exclusivity period per patent, regardless of
how dierent various drug products covered by the same patent were in strength,
dosage, formulation, or indication. Thus, the court denied Apotex's requested
relief and upheld FDA's position.340
D.
336Id. at 459.
337Id. at 456.
338Id. at 461.
339Id.
340Id. at 462-63.
61Recent FDA Interpretations
In response to the onslaught of recent court decisions, in August, 1999 FDA
issued a proposed rule redening the eligibility requirements for the 180-day
generic market exclusivity period under the Hatch-Waxman Act.341 FDA ac-
cepted comments on the proposed rule but has yet to issue a nal regula-
tion. FDA asserted that, \[c]onsistent with the legislative purpose of section
505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the act, the proposed regulations continue to provide an
incentive for challenging a listed patent, while at the same time preventing pro-
longed or indenite delays in the availability of generic drug products."342 FDA
noted that one important purpose of its proposed regulations was to prevent
rst ANDA applicants from placing a stranglehold on generic drug markets
through strategic behavior, including collusive agreements with pioneer manu-
facturers.343
First, FDA decided to maintain its current position that only the rst ap-
plicant to submit a \substantially complete" ANDA containing a paragraph IV
certication for a listed patent is eligible for the market exclusivity period. If
the rst applicant withdraws its ANDA or amends it to delete the paragraph
IV certication, no applicant is entitled to exclusivity.344 Second, FDA would
amend its current regulations to provide that the rst applicant is eligible for
exclusivity even if it is not sued for patent infringement. If the applicant is sued
and loses, it must withdraw its paragraph IV certication, such that no appli-
cant is eligible for exclusivity. 345 Next, FDA addressed the situation where
multiple ANDA applications are led on the same day when no ANDA applica-
tion for that drug has been previously led: in this case, each ANDA applicant
who led an application that day qualies as a \rst" applicant and is eligible
for an exclusivity period that is shared with all other applicants who led that
341180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 Fed. Reg.
42,873 (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (proposed Aug. 6, 1999).
342Id. at 42,874.
343Id.
344Id. at 42,875.
345Id. at 42,876.
62day.346 FDA then conrmed its current position that no generic exclusivity
period may extend beyond the expiration date of the pioneer patent.347
FDA went on to address the troublesome provisions regarding the triggering of
the market exclusivity period.348 FDA proposed the adoption of a time limit
for triggering the exclusivity period, noting that this approach was suggested
by the Mova and Purepac courts as a way to prevent strategic behavior by rst
ANDA applicants from closing o generic markets. Within a 180-day \trigger-
ing period," either commencement of commercial marketing or a court decision
holding the pioneer patent invalid or non-infringed must occur; otherwise, the
rst ANDA applicant loses its eligibility for market exclusivity and other generic
drugs may be approved and enter the market. In general, the triggering period
would begin on the date that a subsequent ANDA applicant received approval
that would be eective but for the rst applicant's entitlement to exclusivity.349
FDA also explained that it was considering a shortened sixty-day triggering
period in cases where the rst applicant has received nal FDA approval but
has not been sued, or has been sued but the suit was settled or dismissed with-
out decision on the merits, by the time a subsequent ANDA applicant obtains
tentative approval. This shortened provision would provide an additional disin-
centive for rst applicants to strategically foreclose generic drug markets.350
Next, FDA addressed the court decision trigger. FDA proposed to maintain its
position that a only a \nal judgment from which no appeal can be or has been
taken" satises the court decision trigger.351 However, it seemed unlikely that
FDA would adopt this interpretation in its nal rule in light of the D.C. District
346Id.
347Id. at 42,877.
348Id.
349Id. FDA also provided for three special situations:
First, if the rst applicant was sued for patent infringement as a result of its paragraph IV
certication and the litigation is ongoing, the triggering period would not begin until expiration
of the 30-month stay of ANDA approval (see section II.B.3 of this document). Similarly,
if a court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the rst applicant from commercially
marketing its drug product, the triggering period would not begin until the injunction expired.
Finally, the triggering period would not begin until expiration of the statutorily described time
period corresponding with any existing exclusivity periods for the listed drug (see sections
505(j)(5)(D)(ii) and 505A(a) of the act).
350Id. at 42,878.
351Id. at 42,879.
63Court's decision in Mylan. In fact, in March, 2000 FDA issued a Guidance for
Industry352 indicating that it would revise its nal regulation to comply with
the decisions in Mylan and TorPharm. The Guidance sets out FDA's new inter-
pretation of \court" in xx 505(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) and 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) as \the rst
court that renders a decision nding the patent at issue invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed," including a district court. Thus, FDA can approve an ANDA
and the 180-day exclusivity period will begin to run on the date of the district
court decision.353 Stay or reversal of the district court decision will not aect
the running of the exclusivity period, nor will it aect the ANDA's approval
unless the pioneer drug patentee obtains a court injunction barring marketing
of the approved drug under the ANDA. The new denition of \court" will apply
prospectively only to protect parties who reasonably relied on the old denition
in making their business decisions.354
FDA's proposed rule went on to suggest modifying its regulations to provide
that any court decision against the patentee in an infringement or declaratory
judgment suit involving the patent at issue will satisfy the court decision trig-
ger. The suit need not involve the rst ANDA applicant.355 However, FDA
maintained that the suit must be a judgment on the merits holding the patent
invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable; specically, dismissal of a declaratory
judgment suit for lack of justiciable case or controversy would not qualify.356 It
seems likely that FDA will abandon this position in view of the Teva decision.
FDA went on to expressly permit any rst applicant to waive its exclusivity pe-
riod in favor of another applicant once the period has begun. Before the period
has begun, an applicant may surrender its right to exclusivity completely but
may not waive it in favor of another specic applicant.357 Next, FDA noted
352U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Guidance for Industry: Court Decisions, ANDA Approvals, and 180-Day Exclusivity
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (Mar., 2000).
353Id. at 8.
354Id. at 9.
355180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 Fed. Reg.
42,873 at 42,879-80 (to be codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (proposed Aug. 6, 1999).
356Id. at 42,881.
357Id.
64that the rst applicant for each strength of a drug is entitled to a separate
exclusivity period; this interpretation is designed to promote a generic market
with as many drug strengths as possible available as early as possible.358
V.
Conclusion
The litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act in the almost sixteen years
since its enactment demonstrates the Act's complexity and the diculty in-
volved in crafting its provisions into a coherent regulatory framework. Many
commentators have expressed frustration with the Act based on the diculties
surrounding its implementation.359 Some have even argued that the statute
over-regulates and has failed to achieve its goals.360 FDA's most recent pro-
posed rule represents yet another attempt to implement the dicult language
of the Hatch-Waxman Act in compliance with the Act's consumer-friendly goals.
However, recent cases demonstrate that at least some of FDA's well-intentioned
proposals cannot be reconciled with courts' interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage. FDA's consistent eorts to mold the Act's tortuous language into a
cohesive regulatory scheme consistent with legislative intent are commendable.
However, it appears that, after over fteen years of trying, the agency is still
unable to fashion the awkward statute into a meaningful regulatory system that
cannot be manipulated to the advantage of industry players and the detriment
of consumers. Rather than continue to sit back and watch FDA's continued
attempts to tame the beast that it created, Congress should take the initiative
and revisit the Hatch-Waxman Act to clarify the ambiguities and correct the
unintended consequences that have become apparent through over fteen years
of litigation under the statute.
358Id. at 42,882.
359See, e.g., David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a Duck... Uncertainties in Implementing
the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Food
Drug L.J. 111 (1999).
360See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness?, IDEA 389 (1999); David Harnden, Can Generics Survive Under
Hatch-Waxman?, Scrip Mag., Dec. 1998, at 32.
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